The “New” Nature in the Language of Travel: Domingo Navarrete’s and John Locke’s Natural Law Rhetoric

John Locke wrote to Nicolas Toinard, a biblical scholar and friend whom Locke met during his travels in France from 1675-1679, asking him several times to translate Friar Domingo Fernández de Navarrete’s (1676) Tratados Historicos, Politicos, Ethicos, y Religiosos de la Monarchia de China, “dans une langue que j’entend” (2580, 1 May 1699) because, as Toinard observes, it is “tres curieux et rare” (2571, 18/28 April 1699).¹ In fact Locke’s interest persisted when, in the 1706 edition of Essay Concerning Human Understanding, the philosopher used the friar’s travel account of China to argue against innate ideas.²

Not only did Navarrete’s Tratados attract Locke, but other late seventeenth and eighteenth-century luminaries, such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Voltaire.³ Locke and his

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² Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by John W. Yolton (London: Everyman, 1996) was published originally in 1690, but the 1706 edition contains the reference to Navarrete (Book I, Chapter IV, Paragraph 8).

³ See, for example, Leibniz’s (1700) On the Civil Cult of Confucius in Writings on China, edited by Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (Chicago: Open Court, 1994), 61-66; and Voltaire’s Essai Sur les Moeurs (1756) or the English edition An Essay on Universal History, the Manners, and Spirit of Nations, translated by Thomas Nugent (London, 1759). Voltaire calls him, “the famous archbishop Navaretta” (24; vol. 1, ch. II). See also J.S. Cummins’ introduction for
contemporaries read and digested Navarrete’s account in part because the friar presents a novel approach to understanding other cultures, which contrasts sharply with prior and contemporary travel accounts and collections. Many accounts posit an ideological discourse that does not square with particular experiences of unfamiliar cultures in many travel narratives.

Critics of travel writing have commented upon this ideological discourse by following the example of Edward Said’s (1978) *Orientalism* in showing how home cultures, particularly European and Western, use these discourses or cultural frameworks to interact with foreign or unfamiliar cultures. These frameworks reveal, ultimately, the superiority of their home culture; for example, in Said’s study the West uses an ideological discourse or framework to discuss the Other, the East, thereby positioning the West as the superior society: “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.”\(^4\) Recently, critics acknowledge this framework’s often imperialistic role in perceiving other peoples and countries, but they go beyond examining the limiting binaries in descriptions of Navarrete’s wide-ranging influence, especially in England in *The Travels and Controversies of Friar Domingo Navarrete: 1618-1686*, edited by J.S. Cummins (Cambridge: The Hakluyt Society, 1963), ci.

this relationship (Self and Other) to explore the reciprocity within cultural engagements, indicating how cultural encounters compel the home and foreign culture to re-examine and alter thoughts, practices, and ideals, which reveals, according to Felicity Nussbaum, how “among various territorial levels … the local, regional, national, transnational, and global are mutually implicated.”

This is the purpose of this study: to determine how cultural encounters compel writers and thinkers to reassess and modify their ideological discourse after experiencing the reality of the foreign, a reality that often contradicts their cultural framework.

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5 These important works examine cultural interchange: Urs Bitterli, *Cultures in Conflict: Encounters Between European and Non-European Cultures, 1492-1800*, translated by Ritchie Robertson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986); Ivo Kamps and Jyotsna G. Singh, ed., *Travel Knowledge: European ‘Discoveries’ in the Early Modern Period* (New York: Palgrave, 2001). The editors state, “Travel knowledge … is hardly unmediated insofar as it is shaped by political factors, subject to authorial intervention, and plagued by general epistemological problems that attend the movement of information from one culture to another” (6); in *The Global Eighteenth Century* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), Felicity A. Nussbaum, ed., states, “At its best critical global studies tacks back and forth between and among various territorial levels to examine ways in which the local, regional, national, transnational, and global are mutually implicated” (10).

6 I use “framework” and “discourse” similarly to refer at once to Foucault’s notion of discourse as well as Martin Heidegger’s conception of “frame” or “Ge-stett,” an ideological mesh or frame that controls / directs being. See Heidegger’s discussion of this en-framing in “The Question Concerning Technology.” *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. See also Charles B. Guignon, *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*
Navarrete’s *Tratados* interests Locke because its approach largely reflects and reinforces his own: it accounts for diversity and cultural difference while ostensibly circumventing apparent shortcomings in the dominant seventeenth-century Western framework. This dominant discourse determines generally how editors and writers describe unfamiliar cultures, societies,

(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983): “The Anglo-American tradition generally tends to see philosophy as a set of current topics or problems that are to be discussed within pre-given frameworks. … Heidegger maintains that it is these frameworks themselves that are the source of traditional philosophical problems” (1). This reflects notion of discourse reflects Robert Markley’s thesis in *The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600-1730* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); he states, “I argue throughout this study that the confrontation of English writers with China and Japan became a catalyst of their recognition that the discourse of European empire was an ideological construct” (9). However, in my study I identify how travel writers and thinkers alter the framework by drawing upon conceptual tools, such as natural law theory. In contrast, Markley’s analysis pursues a Marxist approach, an “eco-cultural materialism,” which examines the effect of “intensification”: “the investment of more soil, water minerals, or energy per unit of time or area” (15). For those who would disagree with my “ideas” approach, I would say, the debate continues. In his Preface to *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), Jonathan Israel states, “Yet if very few grasped or engaged intellectually with the core ideas in question this did not alter the fact that fundamentally new ideas had shaped, nurtured, and propagated the newly insurgent popular rhetoric used in speeches and newspapers to arouse the people against tradition and authority” (vii). I would add and will show that these “new ideas” shaped travel rhetoric.
and peoples in seventeenth and early eighteenth-century travel collections, such as the brothers Awnsham and John Churchill’s *Collection of Voyages and Travels* (1704-32) and John Harris’s *Navigantium atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca* (1705). Pointedly, the framework posits a nature or reality that is hierarchical, historical, and teleological. Reality contains a progressive biblical narrative that begins with God’s creation, moves and ascends towards a Christian *telos*, and ends in unification with God in a higher universal community, the City of God.⁷ Travel writers and

⁷ These are not new claims or observations; several important texts outline this earlier framework. It originates from the Middle Ages, propelled by Augustine’s thought, and creates a unifying, progressive, and hierarchical metaphysics for European nations, i.e., Christendom. See for instance, C.A. Patrides’s *The Grand Design of God: The Literary Form of the Christian View of History* (London: Routledge, 1972); Otto Friedrich von Gierke’s *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, translated by Frederic William Maitland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958) in which he states that “all Order consists in the subordination of Plurality to Unity … and never and nowhere can a purpose that is common to Many be effectual unless the One rules over the Many and directs the Many to the goal. So is it among the heavenly spheres; so in the harmony of the heavenly bodies, which find their Unity in the *primum mobile*. So is it in every living organism. Here the Soul is the aboriginal principle, while Reason among the powers of the Soul and the Heart among the bodily organs are the representatives of Unity” (9). See Charles Taylor’s *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) and *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). Both describe Augustine’s important role in defining the internal / external notion (internal and external authority) of the Western consciousness. In this pre-modern framework, hierarchy serves an important role, according to W.H. Greenleaf, *Order, Empiricism, and
editors, like the Churchills and Harris, use this basic outline in their introductory sections but conflate the higher biblical narrative with their own society’s and Western culture’s perceived narrative. They use this pre-assigned cultural narrative to catalogue, explain, and authorize their experiences of unfamiliar lands and peoples. Ideally, the framework serves to produce a higher understanding; that is, people use their reason to collect knowledge, which in turn raises them to a higher understanding of God’s universal community. The framework’s focus upon knowledge

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8 In *Sources of the Self*, Charles Taylor explains this framework of reason, knowledge, and higher understanding in terms of Augustine’s philosophy: “Augustine’s proof of God is a proof from the first-person experience of knowing and reasoning. I am aware of my own sensing and thinking; and in reflecting on this, I am made aware of its dependence on something beyond it,
compels travelers to document the exact particulars of foreign cultures and experiences in order to render comprehensive accounts that justify the beginning and ending points of their metaphysical narrative. The Churchills’ and Harris’s collections reflect these notions, and initially Navarrete seems to follow suit.

Yet as Anthony Grafton notes, “rude facts contradicted venerable books, and debate and research might challenge any inherited verity.” The “rude facts” or knowledge of particulars, especially in Navarrete’s observations of China’s prosperity, direct the friar to adjust the old something common. But this turns out on further examination to include not just objects to be known but also the very standards which reason gives allegiance to. So I recognize that this activity which is mine is grounded on and presupposes something higher than I, something which I should look up to and revere. By going inward, I am drawn upward” (134).


10 Ray William Frantz, The English Traveller and the Movement of Ideas: 1660-1732 (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), describes how the emphasis upon observations described in the “new science” proves important for contributing to the attraction of Navarrete’s narrative. Travelers focused on collecting and recounting facts., and these fact-gathering narratives exerted “considerable pressure on crystallized institutions.” Frantz stresses that “[t]he various forces that produced seventeenth- and eighteenth-century humanitarianism, toleration, and cosmopolitanism were … many; but not least among them must have been the influence exerted by travel-books” (118). The previous narratives fail to account for particular observations, so writers seek to find alternate models that may account for incongruities between their metaphysics and their observations. Robert Markley touches upon China’s prosperity in
framework significantly by using features of Thomistic natural law that he mastered as a member of the Dominican order.\textsuperscript{11} The natural law elements diminish the external authority of a preset

“The destin’d Walls / Of Cambalu”: Milton, China, and the Ambiguities of the East,” in Milton and the Imperial Vision, edited by Balachandra Rajan and Elizabeth Sauer (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1999). He states, “China has avoided the civilization-rendering sins that [Peter] Heylyn describes because it has escaped moral, political, economic, and ecological ‘desolation’; it defies the theocentric logic that structures both degenerative and redemptive narratives of history. China’s prosperity was axiomatic” (196). Markley argues that different political groups interpret China’s prosperity in terms of their ideologies: for example, “If the example of China gives royalists in England a means to reinforce their sociopolitical views, the empire’s prosperity offers a more general hope that the age-old dream of an unfallen … nature is not a lost ideal but an attainable and profitable reality” (200). My study follows Markley’s, but identifies how natural law rhetoric accounts for such jarring notions of prosperity, which do not fit within what Markley calls “an authoritative Judeo-Christian metanarrative” (194).

\textsuperscript{11} In A Question of Rites: Friar Domingo Navarrete and the Jesuits in China (Cambridge: Scholar Press, 1993), J.S. Cummins notes that “the friars reverenced their master theologian Thomas Aquinas as an oracle, any divergence from his teaching … was automatically denounced” (33). Cummins adds that “Friar Domingo differs from his predecessors, for … he maintains a consistent, all-embracing praise of the [Chinese] empire”; indeed, Navarrete insists that the Chinese “government fulfills Aquinas’s precepts” (199). See also Henry Joseph Schroeder, “Domingo Fernandez Navarrete,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. X (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911), also online, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10723a.htm
hierarchical, historical, and teleological reality that determines the significance and viability of unfamiliar cultures and peoples, and instead privilege the local and internal authority of people and nations by connecting their critical reasoning capacity with the laws of nature, laws determined by God at the universe’s creation.\(^\text{12}\) That is, in Navarrete’s modified framework people use their critical reasoning capacity to determine how they function within a nature governed by God’s law.\(^\text{13}\) By re-envisioning people’s relation to nature and God, Navarrete re-aligns how people perceive their relation to foreign nations and peoples.

This re-alignment connects directly to observations in John Locke’s *Essays on the Law of Nature* (1663-4), *Essay, Two Treatises* (1689), and his *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689) because, like Navarrete, the philosopher seeks to remove an authorizing hierarchy and historical teleology from nature, by questioning the existence of innate ideas. Instead, particular cultures (accessed 10 May 2010). After finishing his studies, Navarrete was offered the chair of Thomistic theology at several Spanish universities.

\(^\text{12}\) For Richard Tuck in *The Rights of War and Peace: Political thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), one characteristic of this new nature and its framework is that “an individual in nature … was morally identical to a state, and that there were no powers possessed by a state which an individual could not possess in nature” (82). Much of my natural law terminology follows Martin Rhonheimer analysis in *Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy*, translated by Gerald Malsbary (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).

and peoples prove legitimate because they use their critical reasoning capacity to determine their proper function within nature.\textsuperscript{14} Navarrete’s description of China and Locke’s subsequent usage of Navarrete indicate the evolution towards a new cultural discourse in late seventeenth-early eighteenth-century thought that substantially changes the Western framework, thereby signaling a transformation in the European conception of the foreign.\textsuperscript{15} Navarrete’s training in Thomistic theology complements John Locke’s natural law rhetoric,\textsuperscript{16} and discloses how the new Western

\textsuperscript{14} In *Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Daniel Carey states that Locke’s “accumulation of testimony on customs and manners treated human nature as something to be understood inductively, rather than through pre-assigned assumptions about essences” (34). My study differs from Carey because he outlines some of the “implications of cultural diversity,” whereas I seek to define specifically how the European framework changes in response to cultural diversity and how it still insists upon “unifying notions” that continue to join disparate cultures and nations.


\textsuperscript{16} J.B. Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), states, “it is better to take [Locke] to be
discourse foregrounds the local and internal authority of people and nations while removing a prescribed hierarchical and historical narrative from cataloguing Europeans’ observations of foreign peoples and lands. As a result, this natural law re-alignment alters the global sensibility of Europeans, allowing them to conceive that particular foreign cultures could be legitimate and self-sufficient without initially grouping those societies into a culturally pre-determined hierarchical position within their Christian metaphysics.

**Early Eighteenth-Century Travel Collections**

With its stress upon a preset hierarchical and historical narrative, the earlier framework emerges within the introductory sections of the two largest travel collections to appear in print after Richard Hakluyt’s and Samuel Purchas’s compilations of the early seventeenth century: Awnsham and John Churchill’s *A Collection of Voyages and Travels* and John Harris’s *Navigantium atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca*. Unlike the Churchills’ and Harris’s editions, other early eighteenth-century large collections lack extensive introductory sections, such as working with the modern natural law framework” (142). See also Steven Forde, “Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke,” *American Journal of Political Science* 45.2 (2001): 396-409.

James Knapton’s *A New Collection of Voyages and Travels* (1711), which appeared 6 years later, as well as the Royal Society’s third volume of *Miscellanea Curiosa: Containing a collection of Curious Travels and Natural Histories of Countries* (1st edition 1707, 2nd edition 1727).

These important collections show the continued interest in travel narratives and their sustained influence in eighteenth-century English and European thought and culture and, further, reveal two common threads of travel writing, identified by Jas Elsner and Joan-Pau Rubiés (1999): that travel writings contain a European tradition of Roman / Christian imperialist “nationally tinged” paradigms with their “universalist assumptions” and they contain, simultaneously, a “Humanist sensibility” with its focus on science and empiricism. These two threads are evident in the Churchills’ and Harris’s prefatory material on history and navigation, as they seek to establish a historical narrative that chronicles human developments in terms of a biblical / Western progression, while underscoring, at the same time, the importance of reason and observation.

**Awnsham and John Churchill’s Prefatory Material**

Awnsham and John Churchill open the “Introductory Discourse” by locating the history of travel and navigation within a universalizing biblical narrative. Many argue that navigation was, for the editors, the “execution of the direction given by Almighty GOD, since the first vessel we read of in the world, was the ark Noah built by the immediate command and appointment of the Almighty” (ix; col. 1). Since navigation was directed first by God, then “[t]he first vessel ever known to have floated on the waters, was the ark made by God’s appointment, in which Noah

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and his three sons were saved from the universal deluge” (ix; col. 1). Noah and the ark establish a biblical origin to the editors’ account of navigation and exploration, and the unfolding description serves as an extension of God’s divine providence, which the editors note, directs the ship: “this ark, ship, or whatever else it may be called, had neither oars, sails, masts, yards, rudder, or any sort of rigging whatsoever, being only guided by Divine Providence” (ix; col. 2).

Historically, God made the first vessel, and it was directed by his providence, and analogously the story of “navigation” begins with the biblical story, and as such, reveals God’s providence; that is, Western navigation and exploration realize God’s divine plan. Thus by documenting particular inventions and improvements to navigation over the centuries, the editors document the progression of the biblical account. By superimposing the Christian story and telos on navigation, the editors indicate that subsequent travel narratives in the collection will contribute to an on-going biblical story established in prefatory sections. Particular narratives will offer specific insights into the complexity of cultures, peoples, and nations and how they fit into a progressive overarching narrative, determined by divine providence.

For the editors, this narrative advances historically and purposefully towards God and prosperity, and it must when signs of progress exist, like the discovery of the “magnetical needle.” Navigation and humankind benefit tremendously from its development: “it shall suffice here to shew the benefits and advantages navigation, and in it mankind, has reaped by the discovery of this most wonderful secret” (xiv; col. 2). The compass itself suggests the possible advantages that people attain by understanding the relation between navigation, exploration, and God’s plan—prosperity and wealth. Indeed after recounting major excursions into Africa and Asia, the editors underscore the tremendous resources that these vast lands and people offer Europeans:
It now remains to shew what a vast extent of land is by these means made known, which before *Europe* was wholly a stranger to, and the commodities it supplies us with; which is one great point of this discourse, … to shew what benefit is reaped by navigation, and the vast improvement it has received since the discovery of the magnetical needle. (xxxi; col. 1-2)

The editors outline their narrative purpose clearly, showing how they follow the older Western framework. God created the means to navigate; humans have refined this facility through the development of the compass, and now humans enjoy the benefits of this technology by appropriating newly uncovered resources. The story of European exploration and travel

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19 The editors highlight some of the commodities that Africa has to offer Europeans: “gold-dust, ivory, and slaves” (xxxi; col. 2). This turns out to be the extent of that continent’s resources because “the greatest part of it [is] scorched under the torrid zone,” while the natives are “almost naked, no where industrious, and for the most part scarce civilized” (xxxi; col. 2). Referring to Africa, the editors note that the natives hardly fit into a cultural ideal that Europeans would identify. They are “scarce civilized,” pointing to their diminished capacity to partake in the historical progression in contrast to most European countries. The editors also point to the commodities of other lands like Persia, which “to speak by way of trade, the commodities here are diamonds, silk …, cotton …, and infinite plenty of it in calicoes and muslins, all sorts of sweet and rich woods, all the gums, drugs and dyes, all the precious plants, and rich perfumes, not to mention the spices” (xxxii; col. 2); the East Indies: “Their wealth is incredible, for they produce whatever man can wish; but the principal commodities exported are ginger, pepper, camphor, agarick, cassia, wax, etc” (xxxiii; col. 1); and then they list generally the commodities
follows a basic plot established by the biblical narrative. Foreign lands provide the opportunity for Europeans to extract resources and commodities, which ultimately reveal the progress that directs travelers’ actions. When people follow the biblical narrative, they will multiply, improve, and prosper because they follow God’s plan, his providence, which is written into reality itself. Hence, by stressing the importance of realizing God’s plan and attaining happiness, the editors underscore the need to experience and observe disparate foreign lands, peoples, and cultures. Exploration and observation produce knowledge, which, in turn, reveals their progress in the narrative as they advance closer to God.

To encourage this advancement and improvement, Europeans must continue to investigate the unexplored regions of the globe, acquiring knowledge and information, propelling the unfolding historical movement. By either writing or reading travel narratives the traveler and reader benefit and improve because, “[w]hat was cosmography before these discoveries?”; it was scarcely a science, and “great was the ignorance of man” (lxix; col. 1); “But now geography and hydrography have received some perfection by the pains of so many mariners and travelers” as well as “Astronomy” and “Natural and moral history is embellished” (lxix; col. 2). The result is that “[t]rade is raised to the highest pitch, each part of the world supplying the other with what it wants, and bringing home what is accounted most precious and valuable” (lxix; col. 2). Again the editors connect navigation, exploration, and prosperity. Exploration encourages trade, and trade promotes wealth, and prosperity creates a larger prosperous community: the empire of Europe is now extended to the utmost bounds of the earth where several of its nations have conquests and colonies. These and many more are the from this region that “the discovery whereof has been the subject of this discourse, supply the Christian world” (xxxiv; col. 1).
advantages drawn from the labours of those who expose themselves to the
dangers of the vast ocean, and of unknown nations … the relations of one
traveller is an incentive to stir up another to imitate him, whilst the rest of
mankind, in their accounts without stirring a foot, compass the earth and seas,
visit all countries, and converse with all nations. (lxix; col. 2)
The editors connect the unfolding biblical narrative and its promise of prosperity with a global community. This global community, nevertheless, is an “empire” defined by its European attributes and goals, which is validated implicitly by the overarching narrative. Thus, the more Europeans travel, the more they collect information; the more they come to understand the world, the closer they come to establishing a prosperous global European community—a neo-Augustinian City of God. Clearly this expansionist doctrine borrows the Western framework by suggesting that travel and exploration follow a Christian narrative within an ascending hierarchy that moves people towards prosperity and a higher unity with God. The editors conflate, however, this framework with a distinct early eighteenth-century European narrative, which superimposes its ideals upon navigation, exploration, travel, and foreign cultures, while hierarchically positing the superiority of its conventions and practices. In this conflated narrative, European culture directs people upwards towards God’s universal community, which in reality proves to be an early eighteenth-century European global empire. Thus, the ending of the narrative, a universal unification with God, accedes to a universal community that conforms to the European Christian ideals of the late seventeenth, early eighteenth centuries.

Accordingly, to attain the prosperity and progress writ into this cultural narrative, explorers and travelers must practice proper humanist / empiricist methods of observation when

20 See Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World, 24-27.
encountering unfamiliar lands. The editors acquire these methods from the Royal Society, more specifically from a short piece by “Mr. Rook, a fellow of the Royal Society” (lxix; col. 2), that is, Lawrence Rooke, a founding member of the Royal Society, whose “Directions for Sea-men, bound for far Voyages” appeared in the Society’s Philosophical Transactions (1665). The prefatory note states that the Royal Society’s purpose is “to study Nature rather than Books, and from the Observations, made of the Phaenomena and Effects she presents, to compose a History of Her” (140-1). Pointedly the Royal Society’s mandate necessitates the observation of nature so that people may assemble a narrative or record to produce a story of nature. For this reason, members of the society have asked for “Inquiries of things Observable in forrain Countries,” and they offer suggestions on collecting “Particulars, they desire chiefly to be informed about” (141). Thus, Rooke directs sea travelers to mark particulars by indicating their longitude and latitude, plotting coasts, promontories, islands, etc. The editors add that one should “make a reasonable stay at all places where there are antiquities, or any rarities to be observed; and not think that because others have writ on that subject, there is no more to be said; for upon comparing their observations with other mens, they will often find a very considerable difference” (lxxi; col. 2). For the benefit of all, travelers should keep a notebook to make notes; this way, they may transcribe those annotations at night “more methodically.” Additionally, “travelers ought to carry about him several sorts of measures, to take the dimensions of such things as require it” (lxxi; col. 2). By highlighting these “measures” and quantifying experience, the editors affirm that travelers must measure their observations faithfully to provide precise accounts of

21 Philosophical Transactions 1 (1665): 140-143.

22 The OED indicates that the first definition for “history” means “a relation of incidents, ... a narrative, tale, story.” See OED, 2nd edition, 1989.
phenomena. These particulars will contribute to collective knowledge by assisting others to formulate a complete history or story of nature. This narrative will help people understand where they reside hierarchically within the progression of the Western narrative so that they may ascend towards happiness and prosperity in a European-defined global community.

**John Harris’s Prefatory Material**

John Harris’s (1705) Introduction and “Epistle Dedicatory” to the queen reflect similar principles as Awnsham and John Churchill: the reliance upon a preset hierarchical and historical teleology while stressing the importance of evidence and observation. When addressing Queen Anne, Harris underscores England’s own cultural supremacy, stating that “when either a Man hath actually travell’d the whole World himself, or carefully consider’d the Accounts which those give us that have done so, he will be abundantly convinced, that Our own Religion, Government and Constitution is, in the Main, much preferable to any he shall meet with Abroad.” From the outset Harris establishes his own nationally and culturally tinged universalism. Granted, he writes for a patron’s preferment and flattery; nevertheless, the fact that he asserts the primacy of his own culture indicates a tendency to measure the world based upon a definite narrative. Even after surveying the diversity of the world, one must come to the conclusion that one’s own country is superior to another (As we will see, this contrasts significantly with Navarrete). This realization indicates the hierarchical and providential order that God has established which ascends towards prosperity because “Providence seems graciously to have design’d to make us Great and Happy.” By pointing to the importance of providence and wellbeing, Harris imposes, like Awnsham and John Churchill, an English / Protestant *telos* upon travel experiences,

23 N.p.
validating and authorizing observed phenomena. Since other cultures fail to fit into this narrative, they prove deficient and incomplete.

Harris’s Introduction reinforces the importance of conforming to an overarching narrative by documenting the “Origination of Mankind” in the Bible. Harris begins, stating that

> Whoever will carefully and unprejudicately consider, That there hath in all Ages, and amongst all Nations been a constant Tradition, That Mankind had its Original *ex non Genitis*, or from some first Parents not begotten in the common way, but immediately created by God himself. … Whoever, I say, will candidly consider these Evidences, must conclude that we have all the moral Assurances possible, That the World had a Beginning, and that Mankind had it first Original about the Time we have so particular an Account of in the Sacred History of the Bible. (i; pt. I, col. 1)

Like Awnsham and John Churchill, Harris offers his collection as an account of the unfolding and overarching biblical narrative. The Introduction traces a biblical trajectory, in which the Christian God dictates a specific providential beginning and, presumably, ending. The narrative itself validates what Europeans perceive as they experience the world. In fact, Moses’ “account” offers sufficient evidence of the biblical narrative’s authority: “the Account which Moses give us of the peopling of the Earth after the Deluge by Noah’s Children, is so conformable to all the authentick Records yet remaining in any languages, that it carries with it irresistible Evidence” (i; pt. I, col. 1). In an unexplored and un-traveled world, experiences and observations already fit into the predetermined pattern outlined by the biblical narrative. The narrative serves as an authorizing template for documenting and cataloguing phenomena. Its authority is “irresistible.”
Thus the overarching narrative authorizes evidence and dictates how it should be classified, while stressing, simultaneously, the collection of knowledge by observing particulars. While discussing navigation’s improvements, Harris seeks to counter claims that he focuses too much upon “the several particular Steps of these Mens Voyages” (4; bk. 1, ch. 1, col. 1). The reader may tire of the detailed account of years, months, days when sailors travel and find it “minute and trifling.” However, Harris insists upon the significance of such information because “the Particularness of those Observations, which might be a Fault, with respect to a well-known world, is necessary … in reference to a World not yet discovered” (4; bk. 1, ch. 1, col. 2).

Because these lands are unfamiliar, travelers must detail their observations:

Every step taken by a first Discoverer, presents an Original in those Matters; others that come after, do but Copy or Refine upon him, and continue the Story that he begins. … ‘Tis for this Reason, that we propose so punctual an Observation of the several Steps of the Voyages, made by those celebrated Persons, who first ventur’d out into the World, and laid a Foundation for Europe’s Acquaintance and Converse with the remoter Parts of it. (4; bk. 1, ch. 1, col. 2)

For Harris, the age of exploration fits into a narrative or “Story” that the travelers and explorers relate through their experiences in foreign lands. The beginning of the story has been written. Now the explorers must collect particulars to accumulate knowledge, which will reveal the unfolding historical storyline. To understand their position within the story, travelers must note details and particulars of experience to map reality, thereby acquiring sufficient knowledge to realize their position within God’s progressive, overarching, and providential plan. Once travelers become aware of their position in the providential plan, then they realize the primacy and significance of their own culture’s perspective. Unfortunately, the detailed documentation of
experiences and observations, encouraged by Harris, the Churchills, and the Royal Society, complica
tes their notion of a hierarchical and historical narrative, as seen in John Locke’s arguments against innate ideas and in Navarrete’s account of China’s history, culture, and prosperity.

**John Locke, Reason, Laws of Nature, and Cultural Difference**

John Locke’s argument against innate ideas underscores how experiences about other cultures have complicated a predetermined narrative. In the initial chapters of *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, travel accounts reveal, as Daniel Carey says, the “disparities in religious belief and moral practice across the world” and consequently these accounts, by writers such as Thevenot, Ovington, and Loubere, “unseat the mistaken view that certain innate ideas or principles informed human nature.”24 Further, Locke’s emphasis upon localized, inward reason resists the need to situate cultures within a hierarchy or historical teleology; instead, people use reason to determine how they function within nature, which is based upon laws established by God and accessible to all humans.25 This shift towards focusing on determining one’s function within nature points towards his and Navarrete’s new framework.

When Locke maintains that innate principles do not exist in the mind, he challenges the notion that humans possess imprinted principles that guide their behavior. He states: “Nature, I

24 Carey, *Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson*, 34.

25 In “Locke on the Law of Nature,” *The Philosophical Review* 67.4 (1958): 477-98, John W. Yolton states, “What [Locke] was arguing for in the second of these Essays was that the law of nature … is not known through inscription or handed down by tradition but is known by reason through sense experience” (482).
confess, has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery ... these may be observed in all persons and all ages, steady and universal; but these are inclinations of the appetite to good, not impressions of truth on the understanding” (31; bk. I, ch. III, par. 3).

Locke states that there are certain inclinations that are inherent to all humans; however, they are not principles of truth and knowledge imprinted upon people’s understanding, principles that, ready-made, help people determine the nature of reality. Since principles are not imprinted upon people’s minds, then different people may generate, for example, very different moral rules: “Hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning moral rules which are to be found amongst men, according to the different sorts of happiness they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves” (33; bk. I, ch. III, par. 6). Different people develop different moral standards because they possess varying perspectives of reality and happiness directed by their inclinations that belie, consequently, the existence of a pre-set hierarchical and historical order. If an order exists within people’s minds, then people across the globe would possess similar moral laws and conceptions of happiness. Experience shows this is not the case.


27 This notion of “inclinations” connects with Aquinas’s (1964-76) natural law theory: “it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends” (II, q. 91, a. 2). *Summa Theologica*, New Advent, http://www.newadvent.org/summa/ (accessed 10 May 2010). See again Martin Rhonheimer’s authoritative analysis of Aquinas’s thought, 67.

For instance, Locke points out how different cultures acknowledge a deity. He states that “[i]f any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of God may” (39; bk. I, ch. IV, par. 8). Yet he uses examples from travel narratives like Navarrete’s to demonstrate that there are “whole nations … amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a god.” Indeed some nations enjoy the “improvements of arts and sciences” without the knowledge of God. These cultures experience “improvements” or progress because they use and apply their faculties; however, they do not possess knowledge of God because they have not used or applied their faculties to a sufficient extent:

For, though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a god, yet he that shall content himself with things as he finds them in this world, as they minister to his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry a little further into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a being. (43; bk. I, ch. IV, par. 23)

So the attainment of true knowledge “depends upon the right use of those powers nature hath bestowed upon us.” For this reason, a culture may improve without the knowledge of God because they use their natural faculties to a certain extent, while stopping short in applying them sufficiently to attain some notion of the true deity. For this reason, Locke states: “There is a

29 He uses other travel narratives such as Jean de Thevenot’s Relation d’un Voyage fait au Levant (1664); Jean de Léry’s History of a Voyage to the Land of Brazil, Also Called America (1578); P.M. La Martinière’s Voyage des Pays Septentrionaux (1676); E. A. Terry’s Voyage to East India (1655); J.A. Ovington’s A Voyage to the Suratt (1696); and La Loubere’s Du Royaume de Siam (1691).
great deal of difference between an innate law and a law of nature, between something imprinted in our minds in their very original, and something that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural faculties” (36; bk. I, ch. III, par. 13).  

By using their natural faculties, reason and sense, people may attain knowledge of the world and God; however, if they fail to acquire an understanding of God, then clearly they fail to “make inquiry a little further into their causes.”

Hence, for Locke, people use reason to examine nature to acquire knowledge; that is, by using their natural faculties, reason and sense, they discover through experience the constitution of reality. Locke has shifted the emphasis significantly. For Churchill brothers, the older framework serves as the ready-made, authorizing historical template to chronicle and catalogue phenomena. The more information and knowledge one collects, the more one reveals the narrative, and the closer one moves to God and his universal community. However, for Locke, people do not begin passively with an imprinted narrative that influences how they should catalogue experience; rather people begin with inclinations and their own natural faculties, which allow them to discover the laws of nature.

30 Aquinas, *Summa*, maintains that “natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law” (II, q. 91, a. 2).

31 Yolton, “Locke on the Law of Nature,” states that for Locke “[r]eason and sense are the sole foundations for all knowledge” (482).

32 Martin Rhonheimer, *Natural Law and Practical Reason*, states that with natural law, “man himself becomes a participating and responsible interpreter of the divine providence” (68). With natural law, people actively interpret divine providence, rather than passively accept the authority of the hierarchical narrative in the old framework.
Locke provides an excellent example of this inward authority attached to the natural faculties in his *Two Treatises of Government*. By focusing on people’s reason and sense, Locke diminishes the external authority of a hierarchy and strengthens the internal authority of all people: “Man has a Natural Freedom …, since all that share in the same common Nature, Faculties, and Powers, are in Nature equal, and ought to partake in the same common Rights and Privileges, till the manifest appointment of God … can be produced to show any particular Person’s Supremacy” (208; tr. I, ch. VI, par. 67, lines 20-26). Since all people share the same natural faculties, they are equal; no person dominates another.

Locke adds in the *Second Treatise* that the “State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone,” and for everyone, “Reason, … is that Law” (Treatise II, Chapter II, Paragraph 6, Lines 6-7). If people choose to break a law of nature, they break the law of reason too: “In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of men for their mutual

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34 In “The Coherence of a Mind: John Locke and the Law of Nature,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 37.1 (1999): 73-90, Alex Tuckness states: “Locke believed that reason was sufficient to generate knowledge of ourselves as created beings and to recognize that all other creatures created with the same capacities, particularly reason, were for that reason equal and not in a state of subordination” (84).

35 Like a law, reason functions as a “rule,” “measure,” a “standard” or a “measuring stick,” that orders actions to a particular end; see again Martin Rhonheimer, *Natural Law and Practical Reason*, 62 & 70.
security” (290; tr. II, ch. II, par. 8, lines 9-13). God has created laws of nature that all people can understand by using their reason. People who do not follow Christianity have the ability to live prosperously without direct knowledge of the Bible because they use their reason to follow the laws in nature that God established at creation. Locke suggests as much by emphasizing people’s critical reasoning capacity regarding questions of spirituality in A Letter Concerning Toleration:

[N]o man can so far abandon the care of his own Salvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other …. For no Man can, if he would, conform his Faith to the Dictates of another. All the Life and Power of true Religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind. (26)

Religious persuasion occurs within the particular mind, not within a predetermined and prescribed order within reality. For this reason one should tolerate other religions because others cannot be forced to believe one’s own religious ideals; rather, others should be persuaded only through reason and inward reflection. Indeed, “however clearly we may think this or the other doctrine to be deduced from Scripture, we ought not therefore to impose it upon others, as a necessary Article of Faith; … unless we would be content also that other Doctrines should be imposed upon us in the same manner” (57). Since spiritual persuasion occurs within the mind and innate principles are not imprinted in the mind, then people should avoid presuming that their interpretation of doctrine must be imposed upon others. This notion itself resists indicating that particular perspectives are higher or more significant than another. Clearly Locke’s emphasis upon the laws of nature and people’s natural faculties serves to erode a preset,

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authorizing narrative that catalogues information under culturally determined stratifications. The old framework informs, however, a portion of Locke’s theory, when he insists that people must use their faculties, sense and reason, sufficiently to acquire a complete understanding of the godhead. 37 This point will prove important for Navarrete too, suggesting the limitations that these natural law accounts place upon understanding cultural difference.

With Locke’s natural law principles, we can understand why Navarrete’s narrative would attract Locke and other eighteenth-century thinkers. 38 Navarrete uses natural law philosophy and language that stresses reason and its role in determining how people function within nature, rather than privileging the external authority of a hierarchical and historical teleology.

Domingo Fernández Navarrete and China

Like the Churchills and Harris, Navarrete bears a cultural framework, but his experiences of China limit its application. 39 Navarrete, a friar in the Dominican order and scholar of Thomistic

37 Carey, Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, states that Locke “assumes that even the most advanced mind among [natives] would lack an array of thoughts extending beyond their circle. Their condition results from the fact they do not take part in conversation with ‘thinking Men’, balancing rival positions as they search for truth, aided by literacy” (90).

38 I do not argue that Locke propounds a Thomistic natural law doctrine. Rather, I argue that Locke senses characteristics of natural law in Navarrete’s travel narrative. These characteristics include the natural faculties and laws in nature.

39 I use Domingo Fernández Navarrette’s An Account of the Empire of China in A Collection of Voyages and Travels, edited by Awnsham and John Churchill (London, 1705). Subsequent quotations within the text refer to this edition. I used the Churchill translation because, as J.S.
theology, seeks to discover truth, like the previous editors, and this truth serves a larger purpose of accumulating knowledge that directs people to God. Differing from the Churchills and Harris, Navarrete draws upon his background in Thomistic theology to minimize the hierarchical and historical narrative while expanding the significance of reason and the laws of nature. By highlighting reason, the “light of nature” (luz natural), Navarrete privileges the authority of particular and local experiences of people existing and functioning within nature. For Navarrete, the Chinese are heathen ultimately, but they prosper and thrive locally because they use reason to follow the law that God establishes within nature.

Navarrete follows the preceding editors in his humanist / empiricist stress upon particulars, details, facts, and knowledge. One should examine foreign cultures in detail—whether by examining their customs and traditions or reading their cultural documents—to collect and document truth. In his preface, “The Author to the Reader,” Navarrete registers his intentions first stating, “There is no doubt but he who writes and aspires to the name of a historian, is obliged in the first place to shield and guard himself with truth [verdad],” and then adding “I resolved not to make account in this work of any thing but what I have seen, read, and has gone through my hands. The penalty he incurs who does not stick to truth in all particulars, is, not to be believed when he speaks true” (N.p.; vol. I, par. 2, col. 1). Like the previous editors, Cummins notes, “On the whole … the translator managed remarkably well” (cxvii). Navarrete, Domingo, The Travels and Controversies of Friar Domingo Navarrete: 1618-1686, edited by J.S. Cummins (Cambridge: The Hakluyt Society, 1963). Subsequent translations from the original Spanish originate from Tratados Historicos, Politicos, Ethicos, y Religiosos de la Monarchia de China (Madrid, 1676) from Manuscripts, Archives, and Special Collections in Washington State University Library.
Navarrete signals his empirical method by stressing truth and particulars; nonetheless, the particulars should fit into an overarching narrative: “How could we in China oppose abundance of errors [*innumerables errores*] those heathens hold, if we did not read and study their books and doctrine? … It is also useful to make our benefit of what truth there is found in them” (133; vol. I, bk. IV, col. 2). Europeans may read foreign texts to discover truth, which adds to collective understanding, while exposing the errors in the foreign culture’s thought and practices, by comparing these to a pre-determined narrative. In many ways, the “errors those heathens hold” originate from their failure to conform to Navarrete’s own cultural narrative metaphysics, which he defends by repeatedly drawing upon the authority of church thinkers like Aquinas, Augustine, Jerome, and others. In addition, Navarrete submits his account to the Catholic Church and “its universal head the pope,” signaling the ultimate authority as the hierarchical head of earthly Church, the pope.

Even so, this authorizing Christian narrative falters as Navarrete experiences incongruities between his cultural narrative and the customs of China. Particularly, he glimpses Chinese prosperity:

> The empire of *China* has such plenty and even superfluity of all things, that it would take up many volumes to treat of them in particular. My design is only to give some hints of what is most remarkable, which will suffice to make known how bountifully GOD has dealt with those people who know him not, giving them all they can desire, without being necessitated to seek for any thing abroad; we that have been there, can testify this truth. (31; vol. I, bk. I, ch. 14, col. 1)

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40 Navarrete’s “The Author to the Reader,” last page, 2nd col.
He practices empiricist notions by pointing to the “truth” of his experiences, and these experiences show the “superfluity” and bounty of China. This prosperity contrasts, however, with the friar’s own teleological Christian narrative. For instance, when commenting upon the emperor “Tai Zung,” Navarrete states: “Therefore it is said, that the first thing a king ought to conceive, is, that GOD is absolute lord of all things; and it is most certain that all things prosper [sucede todo bien] with him that truly serves and honours him.” Then, Navarrete quotes Aquinas to support this assertion: “My holy father S. Thomas has excellent lines to this purpose…. he makes out his assertion by what happened to Solomon, for whilst he continued to worship the true GOD, his kingdom and glory still advanced. He fail’d in that particular, and soon found a general decay in all respects” (94; vol. 1, bk. II, ch. 15, par. 6). Clearly for Navarrete prosperity and progress connect to a Christian telos, the worship of “the true GOD.” Based upon Navarrete’s own declaration and Churchills’ and Harris’s framework, the Chinese should not prosper because they fail to realize their position within a hierarchical Christian teleology.41

41 Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World, describes the medieval empires and those that may succeed them in terms of an “Aristotelian identity. The ancient polis had made human flourishing — eudaimonia — possible. By rendering eudaimonia as ‘blessedness’ …, Aristotle’s thirteenth-century translator, Robert Grosseteste, had made that a state which it was clearly only possible to achieve within the territorial limits of the Christian monarchia” (27). Rome’s new heirs realized that powerful and prosperous countries existed, like the Ottoman Empire and China, but their cultural framework neglected to account for that prosperity, because cultural interaction was limited. However, according to Donald F. Lach and Edwin J. Van Kley, “Asia in the Eyes of Europe: The Seventeenth Century,” (242-259) in An Expanding World: The European Impact on World History, 1450-1800, vol. 31: part 1, Facing Each Other: The World’s
However, the culture and people of China thrive, even at times showing more civility and virtue than their Christian European counterparts. For the Chinese never fail of their usual civilities. These things very often made us stand amaz’d, and we could not but remember the rude scoffing, and insolent expressions commonly us’d in our countries, in cities, upon the road, and in other places, to gentlemen, elderly persons, modest maids, and churchmen; and notwithstanding all this those must pass for Barbarians, and we be look’d upon as very much civiliz’d. (34; vol. I, bk. I, ch. 15, par. 6)

Although the old framework requires that Navarrete designate the Chinese as “Barbarians,” because they fail to measure up to his culture’s hierarchical standards, his experiences prove otherwise and contradict the framework. Indeed after recounting part of China’s history and discussing particular emperors, like “Kuang Vu” and “Ming Ti,” Navarrete states, “Anybody that

Perception of Europe and Europe’s Perception of the World, edited by Anthony Pagden (Burlington: Ashgate, 2000), 242-259, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a “stream of information” became “a virtual deluge” that altered European stereotypes of China. Indeed, Anthony Pagden writes in the introduction of Facing Each Other: “Ever since Marco Polo’s celebrated description of the seventeen years he claimed to have spent there between 1274 and 1291, supposedly in the service of Kublai Khan, Western Europe had maintained sporadic contact with China. It was not, however, until the first Jesuit mission was established by Matteo Ricci in 1583, that any sustained and serious attempt to understand and evaluate Chinese culture was made” (xxix). In The Travels and Controversies of Friar Domingo Navarrete, J.S. Cummins paraphrases Voltaire, “In the seventeenth century … almost nothing was known of the Empire” (ci).
had not known these emperors were heathens, would certainly by their actions have taken them for good Christians” (104; vol. 1, bk. II, ch. 18, par. 9).

Between his actual experiences of the Chinese and his authorizing cultural narrative, Navarrete reveals disjunctions or complications within his cultural discourse. By emphasizing the “truth” in details and facts, the friar notices the prosperity and wealth of China, whether in acquiring commodities or practicing virtues. These observations fail to reconcile with the cultural framework that insists prosperity is attached to a hierarchical, historical, and teleological Christian narrative. According to the narrative, people accumulate knowledge, which indicates their hierarchical position in relation to the higher narrative trajectory, which, in turn, reveals their position in the historical progression towards a Christian telos. The old narrative and framework fail, however, to account for a prosperous and powerful China. In order to reconcile the disjunction between the framework and his observations, Navarrete must modify his understanding of how people move towards God.


43 In “A Peculiar But Uninteresting Nation,” David Porter indicates how “the very principles of trade seem to originate … in a divinely given natural order of things” (185). He adds that this creates a “commercialist telos” (189). Since the Chinese fail to follow the commercialist telos, then they fail to recognize progress and advancement. The attachment of a telos to commerce comes about from early eighteenth-century writers connecting natural law theory to a stadial historical progression. See Ronald L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge:
For this reason, the friar alters people’s relationship to nature. To do this, he stresses a Christian telos, like the previous editors, but indicates that it is realized by focusing on direct observation of nature. He states in Chapter 15 that

GOD is wonderful in his creatures, and stupendous in the multitude, diversity and beauty of them; the variety of only plants he has created, were sufficient for ever to express his great power and infinite wisdom. The trees, flowers, fruits, and plants I my self have seen in my life time, are so very numerous, they would more than fill a large volume. (32; par. 1)

The world’s complexity and diversity serve as expressions of God. The more people observe, the more the natural world seems to validate God. In Chapter 19, Navarrete states: “There is no doubt but all we have and shall write, is a great motive to excite us to praise our LORD, and discover his infinite power and wisdom: for the more man knows of the creatures, the more occasion he has to bless and magnify [alabar, y engrandecer] his Creator” (42; par. 1). The more one observes God’s creation, the more the devout may “bless and magnify” him. That is, the more one knows about the natural world, the more one understands its relation to God. Thus one must observe the natural world to prosper and to acquire wisdom:

Remember then what GOD has created, it is a plain case, the end is to bless and praise his divine Majesty. We have sufficient matter for it, in that which GOD has so bountifully bestow’d [liberalidad concediò] on the heathen Chinese, and perhaps he has given them so much that they may have the less excuse for their ignorance of his Godhead (42; ch. 19, par. 1).

So far, Navarrete appears to follow the Churchills’ and Harris’s framework, by stressing the importance of observing the created world through the Christian *telos*. That is, when observing creation, people should direct themselves by following the end of blessing and praising God. Thus, one perceives nature through a Christian end, and when people view nature through that end, then they will realize God’s bounty. All the more reprehensible for the Chinese, because they enjoy God’s bounty and prosperity, yet they are ignorant “of his Godhead” (We will return to this observation of the Chinese later, when showing Navarrete’s similarities to Locke).

However, Navarrete’s emphasis upon creation, nature, and diversity signals his significant change in tone and approach. In truth, rather than appeal to an authorizing hierarchical narrative, the friar emphasizes the significance of the diverse and heterogeneous natural world, part of God’s creation.

In the preface, “The Author to the Reader,” Navarrete connects this emphasis upon nature’s diversity with people’s critical reasoning capacity. Even more than the previous editors, Navarrete foregrounds the observation of particulars in foreign cultures by highlighting God’s complex and diverse nature, indicating that God’s heterogeneous world offers many truths that travelers could overlook, if they follow their passions. Navarrete’s tone shifts from the previous accounts by cautioning travelers not to view unfamiliar cultures as peculiar or strange, simply because they differ from a traveler’s home culture: “otherwise only what we see in our own countries would be true, and all the rest fabulous, which is unreasonable.” Instead of seeing their own culture as the “truth,” travelers should look for truth elsewhere, and he couples this wide-ranging notion of truth with reason: “[w]e must not be governed by passion, or private affection [*affectos particulares*], but by reason [*la razon*], and the understanding, which we know does not
comprehend all that is in the world.”44 Truth exists in unfamiliar lands, and reason tells one this, whereas too much focus on one’s own culture reveals the influence of “private affection.” In fact, if people use reason when examining other cultures, they may observe that China offers much to learn because even a remote nation like China can access the “light of nature.” He affirms, “my design is no other but to make known what light of nature [mi intento a manifestar la luz] a nation so remote from conversation and commerce with all others as China is, has had for so many ages.”45

The natural law language of the “light of nature” reveals Navarrete’s similar approach to Locke, for example, in the earlier Essays on the Law of Nature (1663-64), his later Essay, and Two Treatises. In Essays, Locke states, “It is thus evident that there is a natural law …, and that this law can be known by the light of nature, i.e., by an inward process of reasoning starting from sense-experience” (97). This “light of nature” sanctions an internal law because “the law of nature is to be inferred not from men’s behaviour but from their innermost ways of thinking,” where “precepts of nature are imprinted” and “are the same in every one of us,” which function as an “internal law” (167). Similar to Letter, the philosopher maintains that the “light of nature” is an “inward process” that strengthens one’s internal authority. Following the same course, Navarrete privileges this internal law and its authority by foregrounding reason and observations, rather than deferring to the specious and emotional authority of a cultural narrative.


45 Navarrete, paragraph two.

46 Navarrete, bk. 4, ch. 2. This chapter deals with reason and the light of nature (la razón, y luz natural).
For Navarrete, the “light of nature” permits people, through reason, to access the laws of nature that God established at creation, allowing them to acquire a broader understanding of phenomena, as long as they remain receptive to heterogeneous truth:

Those who are well read and curious, are safer, because they take better measures to go by; especially those who leaving their own country, have travell’d through strange countries, these have more lofty and universal ideas of things; they are less surpriz’d, and make a different judgment of what they hear or read, without rashly judging that doubtful and uncertain [sin arrojarse temerarios à censurar de dudoso], which is new to them.47

Differing from the editors, who authorize new experiences with cultural hierarchies and narratives, which for Navarrete make people “rashly” (temerarios) judge, Navarrete opts for the inward authority of sober reason and the senses, which allow people to acquire more “universal ideas of things.” They gain more knowledge, which allows them to calmly and rationally judge new experiences, without succumbing to the emotional distractions and biases of their own culture: “[h]e who has gain’d especial and particular knowledge of some points by experience, may freely and without apprehension [libremente, y sin temor] speak to them.”48 Particular observations of phenomena carry their own validity. Instead of using the external authority of a hierarchical and teleological narrative, people may look to themselves and how they function within their local environment to determine how they interpret and understand phenomena. This internal, local authority may explain, in some ways, Navarrete’s position in the Chinese Rites Controversy: that the missionaries should base their understanding of Chinese religious thought,


48 Navarrete, par. 4.
not upon classic texts, but upon the later commentators of those same texts. Navarrete states that

the Chinese doctors themselves, who, as men learned in their own doctrine, are better judges of the sense of their books than the Europeans, more skilful and unbiass’d [experimentados, y desapassionados], and ought to be of more reputation in their own affairs than strangers; unless perhaps any one without regard to demonstration, will give more credit to his own imaginations than to the known truth. … It is therefore certain, that in what relates to China, we are to follow the opinion and judgment [el sentir, y juzyio] of the Chinese doctors. (74; vol. 1, bk. 2, ch. 9, par. 1)

To properly understand Chinese doctrine, the missionaries should defer to the “opinion and judgment” of local scholars because they are “more skilful and unbiass’d,” in contrast to the Europeans who, informed by their private cultural affections, would disregard demonstrable evidence and “give more credit to [their] own imaginations.” By following their private affections people reveal their cultural biases and prejudices. Thus, travelers should rely upon established local knowledge.

By using reason to determine how they should act within proximate nature, people may flourish because their reason determines the law of nature that God established at creation.

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50 I borrow this language of “proximate” nature from Baruch Spinoza’s *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670) in *Complete Works*, translated by Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002).
Remarkably, nature and people’s inward faculties provide the means for the Chinese to prosper, without knowledge of the Christian conception of the good or God.

For instance, when recounting Chinese history, Navarrete mentions “Kao Juen, one of the council of state.” Kao Juen is a singular figure because “having serv’d five emperors for the space of fifty years, [he] was not found to have committed the least fault or slip in the execution of his office.” Not only did he faithfully execute his duties but “[t]his heathen [Gentil] was very much addicted to virtue, sparing, humble, upright, and uncorrupted” (92; vol. 1, bk. II, ch. 14, par. 12). Since Kao Juen was such an upstanding and virtuous figure, Navarrete adds, “Great pity that such a man should not have the knowledge of GOD!” Kao Juen, a “heathen,” practices virtue better and thrives more than many Europeans: “Few are to be found among Christians that will imitate him.” In order to explain the existence of a “heathen” with such remarkable virtue, Navarrete draws upon natural law rhetoric: “But if he observ’d the law of nature [ley natural], he could not fail of the assistance of his Maker.” Notably, even without knowing, reading, or understanding divine law, Christian doctrine, someone may gain the “assistance of his Maker,” if he “observ’d the law of nature.” Navarrete’s seemingly casual comment signals a dramatic shift within the cultural discourse—a shift that foregrounds local authority and understanding by redirecting people’s relation to nature. Instead of appealing to a hierarchy and teleology in nature to authorize the statesman’s actions, the friar allows the possibility for the statesman to

He argues that the Scriptures (and other such validating narratives) do “not explain things through their proximate causes”; instead, using “narratives it merely employs such order and such language as is most effective in moving men—and particularly the common people—to devotion” (451). The Scriptures and narratives stimulate people’s passions rather than allow people to use the “light of reason.”
“observe” the law of nature, which is accessible to all, to authorize his determination of right and wrong action.\textsuperscript{51}

Navarrete repeats this natural law rhetoric when describing and arguing against Buddhism—a “hellish sect” (\textit{pestifera secta}) (78; vol. 1, bk. II, ch. 11, par 2), which he calls “\textit{Foe}.” Despite his disapproval of the “sect,” he maintains that many of its followers “have liv’d good lives [\textit{vivido ajustadamente}] according to the laws of nature [\textit{la ley natural}]” (82; vol. 1, bk. 2, ch. 12, par. 10). Like the virtuous statesman, Navarrete insists that the Chinese can lead virtuous lives and prosper as long as they use reason when observing phenomena, which allows them to follow the laws of nature, or God’s eternal law or providence. Importantly, to live virtuously, they must not submit to the external authority of God’s divine law, which resides in the Bible.\textsuperscript{52} Since they do not reflect upon divine law, Navarrete indicates that “there is little likelihood they should be sav’d” (82; vol. 1, bk. 2, ch. 12, par. 10). Although they may lead

\textsuperscript{51} This natural law influence occurs before notions of progress and commerce, or the development of, as David Porter calls it, a “commercialist telos.” Again, see Ronald L. Meek’s \textit{Social Science and the Ignoble Savage} and his discussion of a stadial progression and its connection to commerce in the mid-eighteenth century. See also Jennifer Pitts’ discussion of Adam Smith in \textit{A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

\textsuperscript{52} Navarrete praises certain aspects of Chinese writings on moral virtue in Book IV, Chapters 1-3. Also, Aquinas draws a distinction between eternal law and divine law. Eternal law, divine providence, differs from natural law because, for Aquinas, \textit{Summa}, “natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law” (II, q. 91, a. 2). Divine law stems from the Bible.
“good lives” because they use reason, the “light of nature,” to follow the laws of nature, their ignorance of biblical doctrine prevents their salvation. Navarrete offers an example by referring to a Christian martyr:

I follow the opinion of S. Peter Marinmenus martyr. … He lying sick at Damascus, some Mahometans came to visit him. The saint told them that those who did not profess the law of GOD went to hell, as Mahomet had done. The infidels kill’d him for these words, and he was a glorious martyr. Why might not he be so, who should say the same of Foe and others? (82; vol. 1, bk. 2, ch. 12, par. 8)

For Navarrete, the ‘Foe’ or Buddhists will go to hell as much as the “Mahometans” because they fail to acknowledge the Christian telos. They fail to recognize the ultimate authority of biblical doctrine.

Here we can outline Navarrete’s approach. In the new framework, non-European lands and cultures could contain “good” people, even though they fail to recognize the Christian God. People, like the Chinese, could live their entire lives without following the dictates of Christ or divine law, yet still prosper. They may attain some measure of earthly happiness by using reason to interpret the eternal laws that God placed within nature at the universe’s foundation. In this move, Navarrete clearly distances God from the Westerner’s account of foreign cultures by removing the authorizing hierarchy and narrative within nature that would direct experiences and

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53 Again, see footnotes 10 and 41. The fact that the Chinese fail to fit within this Western / Christian narrative of virtue and prosperity necessitates a restructuring of the framework by using natural law theory.
observations towards a Christian telos.⁵⁴ People do not require an authorizing hierarchy or teleology because nature and reason provide the means by which people determine how they should or should not function. Similar to Locke’s arguments against innate ideas, Navarrete’s focus on the “light of nature” diminishes the role of a pre-assigned, externally validating authority, and foregrounds the critical reasoning capacity and observations of people in acquiring knowledge. Thus by underscoring reason and observation, Navarrete and Locke subscribe to a similar framework that accounts for diversity and cultural difference by drawing from features of natural law rhetoric that empower the internal, local, and particular.

As evident from Navarrete’s disapproval of Buddhism, this natural law rhetoric includes aspects of the old framework, like Locke, in attaching a Christian telos to people’s reasoned observations of nature. If people fail to reason and observe sufficiently to acquire an understanding of the Christian God, then they will not receive salvation. In this sense, different people and cultures may thrive locally because they use reason to regulate their natural inclinations, but they may fail universally because they use reason insufficiently to perceive their larger, metaphysical connection to the Christian God. As noted earlier, Navarrete finds this especially disappointing for the Chinese because God “has given them so much that they may have the less excuse for their ignorance of his Godhead” (42; vol. 1, bk. 1, ch. 19, par. 1). The Chinese fail to exercise reason sufficiently to discover the truth of the Christian Godhead, even

though the old framework clearly suggests they should, because of their prosperity. Thus, on the local level, they thrive because they use reason and observation to perceive the laws of nature, but on the larger level, the metaphysical totality, they fail because they do not follow the writer’s own conception of the Christian good—in this case, Navarrete’s Catholicism or Locke’s Protestantism. To summarize, Navarrete shifts the emphasis towards how people reason within nature, which prevents unfamiliar peoples and cultures from being validated and authorized by a hierarchical, historical, and teleological narrative; yet, in relation to the metaphysical totality, he designates them as inferior because they reason and observe insufficiently and do not recognize the truth of the Christian God.

In Navarrete’s Tratados and Locke’s thought, the metaphysical limits privilege the home culture in abstract totality, but the natural law rhetoric authorizes particular cultures in particular, proximate nature. That is, the new travel discourse / framework embraces local and internal authority, without immediately submitting distant cultures to the preset standards of a cultural narrative, and it re-aligns people’s relation to nature, underscoring their critical reasoning capacity and their observations, which connects them to the laws of nature, established by God at creation. Consequently, by minimizing the influence of a pre-assigned hierarchical, teleological, historical, and metaphysical narrative, the new framework distances the home culture from using the Christian God and telos to regulate cultural difference; that is, it distances God from authorizing proximate reality. Contrasting with Awnsham and John Churchill’s and John Harris’s collections, which use a framework that validates phenomena through an external hierarchy and narrative, Navarrete and Locke opt for a framework that accepts diversity and cultural difference upon their own terms by underscoring the authority of particular societies— their use of reason and their ability to interpret laws in nature. This shift permits the home
culture to accept unfamiliar beliefs and practices, without cataloguing these customs within hierarchical standards that assert the superiority of one culture over another. Additionally, it points to a burgeoning global sensibility that accepts and embraces cultural difference as necessary in a larger, inclusive, and diverse world community.
The Rhetoric of Travel and Exploration: a New “Nature” and the Other in early to mid-Eighteenth-Century English Travel Collections

Critics have discussed the influence of early and mid-eighteenth-century travel collections upon English and European society\(^i\) and their influences on particular authors,\(^{ii}\) yet few have addressed the evolving rhetoric on navigation and exploration and the depiction of the Other in the collections’ introductory sections. Two of the largest early collections, Awnsham and John Churchill’s *A Collection of Voyages and Travels* (1704-32) and Dr. John Harris’s *Navigantium atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca* (1705),\(^{iii}\) reflect similar language of well-known late sixteenth-, early seventeenth-century travel collections, Richard Hakluyt’s *Principal Navigations* (1589) and Samuel Purchas’s *Purchas His Pilgrims* (1613), in which prefatory sections depict foreign travel, distant nations, and unfamiliar cultures as realizations of a Christian telos.\(^{iv}\) This language changes in Thomas Osborne’s 1745 addition to the Churchills’ *Voyages and Travels*,\(^{v}\) in which his “Introductory Discourse” reflects characteristics of the Churchills’ teleology but also foregrounds a more pronounced attention to empirical classification and observation, as well as commerce—a subject that would predominate in two other major mid-eighteenth century collections: Harris’s later 1744 edition, revised by the historian John Campbell,\(^{vi}\) and the 1745 edition of Thomas Astley / John Green’s collection, *A New General Collection of Voyages and Travels*.\(^{vii}\) This same rhetoric of commerce would continue in Edward Button’s *A New Universal Collection of Voyages and Travels* (1754, 1755).\(^{viii}\) Thus, the mid-eighteenth-century editors alter the overtly teleological rhetoric of the Churchills’ and Harris’s earlier collections by foregrounding trade and commerce,\(^{ix}\) thereby revealing, in the intervening forty years, a fundamental transformation of travel discourse.\(^x\)
To account for this shift, we may draw upon Jas Elsner and Joan-Pau Rubiés’ discussion of travel in *Voyages and Visions: Towards a Cultural History of Travel* (1999). They argue that travel writing should be examined from the perspective of cultural history, thus observing two common threads: a European tradition of Roman / Christian imperialist “nationally tinged” paradigms with their “universalist assumptions” and, simultaneously, a “Humanist sensibility” with its focus on science and empiricism.\textsuperscript{xi}

An overt “nationally tinged” “universalist”, and, I would add, *preset* model appears in Hakluyt’s and Purchas’s early seventeenth-century introductions and again in Awnsham and John Churchill’s and Harris’s early eighteenth-century prefatory material. Like Hakluyt and Purchas, the Churchills and Harris point out religion’s role when relating the importance of and necessity for travel, even describing the development and progression of navigation in terms of a biblical narrative, in which the Bible’s account superimposes upon the story of the Western voyage out. This narrative creates an external, preset, and authorizing discourse within the collections of Hakluyt, Purchas, Churchill, and Harris (1705)—a discourse or framework that posits a nature or reality that is hierarchical, historical, and teleological.\textsuperscript{xii} That is, reality contains an implicit progressive biblical narrative that begins with God’s creation, moves and ascends towards a Christian *telos*, and ends by unifying with God in a determinate, higher universal community, a neo- Augustinian *City of God*.\textsuperscript{xiii} The editors use this basic outline in their introductory sections but conflate the higher biblical narrative with their own society’s and Western culture’s perceived narrative, transforming Augustine’s *City of God* into a contemporary European empire. They use this pre-assigned cultural narrative to catalogue, explain, and authorize their experiences of unfamiliar lands and peoples. Ideally, the framework should produce a higher understanding; that is, people use their reason to collect knowledge,
which in turn raises them to a higher understanding of God’s universal community. The emphasis upon knowledge compels travelers to document the exact particulars of foreign cultures and experiences in order to render comprehensive accounts that justify the beginning and ending points of their metaphysical narrative.

This stress upon knowledge points to Elsner and Rubiés’ second thread: the “Humanist sensibility” and its focus on science and empiricism. In encouraging the collection of empirical knowledge, the editors outline specific practices that travelers should follow to provide accounts of exactitude and verisimilitude. Yet in particular travel accounts “rude facts contradicted venerable books”, as Anthony Grafton notes, and “debate and research might challenge any inherited verity”. The “rude facts” of practical experience complicate the preset imperialist / universalist narratives used to document new experiences and cultures within the travel accounts.

The dual focus on imperialist / universalist narratives and the empirical practice of quantifying experience creates tensions within the earlier collections and consequently engenders a radical alteration in the dominant discourse. As the hierarchical, historical, and teleological rhetoric of the earlier collections fails to account for the variety and complexity of other cultures, a new discourse emerges in Osborne’s 1745 Voyages and Travels, Harris’s / Campbell’s 1744 edition, Astley’s / Green’s, and Button’s collections to accommodate new experiences largely by modifying the conception of nature, using the conceptual scaffolding of seventeenth-century natural law theory and rhetoric. Initially in the earlier notion of nature, a preset historical, hierarchical, and teleological order validates travel experiences, thus connecting travel accounts to a biblical narrative depicting God’s unfolding divine and hierarchical plan for humankind, creating a neo-Augustinian City of God with culturally determinate limits. The new notion,
however, distances and removes an externally authorizing *telos* and its universalizing assumptions from the natural order, in part because empirically acquired travel experiences derive their authority from particular travelers, whose inclinations and critical reasoning capacity help them interpret laws of nature established by God at creation.\textsuperscript{xix} These travelers are citizens within discrete states,\textsuperscript{x} who weigh, measure, and observe, using their reasoning faculty to determine how their inclinations and actions or choices accord or do not accord with the laws of nature.\textsuperscript{xxi} Importantly, when people determine their local and immediate interest by their internal authority—that is, their ability to choose critically in relation to the laws of nature, their proximate environment—without relying upon a preset external narrative, then they cultivate their surroundings, and by developing the local, they interact within a larger space of other peoples and nations, thereby encouraging and promoting prosperity at home and abroad, without positing a determinate cultural limit to a larger world community. Thus, the natural law framework diminishes the external authority of a fixed hierarchical, historical, and teleological reality that determines the significance and viability of unfamiliar cultures and peoples, and instead privileges the discrete, local, particular, internal and self-interested authority of people and nations by connecting their critical reasoning capacity with the laws of nature.\textsuperscript{xxii} This shift in travel discourse fashions a new nature and discourse in which people and states realize their mutual interests by focusing on the authority of the local, and in doing so unite all within an ever-expansive, commercial, indeterminate global order.

**Seventeenth- and Early Eighteenth-Century Travel Collections**
The “nationally tinged” paradigms with their “universalist assumptions” surface overtly within the “Epistle Dedicatiorie in the First Edition, 1589” of Richard Hakluyt’s *Principal Navigations* (1598-1500). The editor relates a well-known anecdote:

I do remember that being a youth […] it was my happe to visit the chamber of M. Richard Hakluyt, my cosin, […] at a time when I found lying open upon his boord certeine bookes of Cosmographie, with a universall Mappe: he seeing me somewhat curious […] began to instruct my ignorance, by shewing me the division of the earth […]: he pointed with his wand to all the knownen Seas, Gulfs, Bays, Straights, Capes, Rivers, Empires, Kingdomes, Dukedoms and Territories of each part […]. From the Mappe he brought me to the Bible, and turning to the 107 Psalme, directed mee to the 23 & 24 verses, where I read, that they which go downe to the sea in ships, and occupy by the great waters, they see the works of the Lord, and his woonders in the deepe. \(xxiii\)

The young Hakluyt’s conversation with his older cousin indicates how travel functions as an expression of God. Explorers and travelers acquire knowledge to realize God’s “wonders” in the uncharted and unexplored regions of the world. When viewing the world map, they simultaneously refer to the Bible; any perusal of the “universal map” and its “seas, gulfs, bays, straits, capes, rivers, empires, kingdoms” involves seeing them concurrently as God’s works. The map tangibly manifests God’s works, writ into reality. Thus, the voyage out instantiates God’s order. In the prefaces of his second edition, Hakluyt continues this universalist / imperialist rhetoric, by referring to the larger community of “Christendome” and encouraging Queen Elizabeth’s imperialist aspirations (39). He states, “Christian people of late hath bene planted with divers English colonies by the royal consent of her sacred Majestie” so that “she shall by Gods assistance, in short space, worke many great and unlooked for effects, increase her dominions, enrich her cofers, and reduce many Pagans to the faith of Christ” (40). Hakluyt’s “nationally tinged” universalist and imperialist language openly supports imperialism as a means
not only to expand the state’s dominions but also the universal community of Christianity. By encouraging the queen to increase England’s influence and convert others to Christianity, Hakluyt seeks to enfold peoples and nations within the determinate telos of Christendom.

Although they appear a century after Hakluyt and Purchas’s collections, Awnsham and John Churchill’s collection and John Harris’s Navigantium reflect a similar “nationally tinged” universalist / imperialist rhetoric in their introductory sections.

_Awnsham and John Churchill_

Awnsham and John Churchill open their “Introductory Discourse” by locating the history of travel and navigation within a biblical narrative and its implied telos. They state that many argue navigation was the “execution of the direction given by Almighty GOD, since the first vessel we read of in the world, was the ark Noah built by the immediate command and appointment of the Almighty” (ix; col. 1). Then they underscore the connection between the biblical account and navigation, asserting that “[t]he first vessel ever known to have floated on the waters, was the ark made by God’s appointment” (ix; col. 1). In mentioning Noah and the ark, the editors establish a biblical origin to exploration, and this origin signals travel’s connection to God’s divine providence, which directs the ship: “this ark, ship, or whatever else it may be called, had neither oars, sails, masts, yards, rudder, or any sort of rigging whatsoever, being only guided by Divine Providence” (ix; col. 2). Since God made the first vessel and directed it with his providence, it follows that the story of “navigation” follows God’s order. The editors imply that Western navigation and exploration realize God’s divine plan. By documenting particular inventions and improvements to navigation over the centuries, the editors document the progression of the biblical account. By superimposing the biblical story on navigation, the Churchills intimate that subsequent travel accounts will contribute to an on-going
biblical story. The particular narratives will offer specific insights into the complexity of cultures, peoples, and nations and how they fit into a progressive overarching narrative, determined by divine providence. The biblical narrative authorizes travel experiences.

The editors then connect this narrative to progress and a larger community. Exploration encourages trade, and trade promotes wealth, and prosperity creates a larger prosperous community: “the empire of Europe is now extended to the utmost bounds of the earth where several of its nations have conquests and colonies” (lxix; col. 2). The progress of travel and navigation points to a broader community, a global community, which is, nonetheless, an “empire” defined by its European attributes and goals, an alternative expression of Hakluyt’s “Christendome.” The more Europeans travel, the more they collect information; the more they come to understand the world, the closer they come to establishing a prosperous global European community—a neo-Augustinian City of God. This expansionist doctrine outlines a discourse of travel and exploration that asserts a Christian narrative wherein people move toward prosperity, upwards in a hierarchy and thereby realize their higher unity with God.xxxvii

Since this universalizing narrative validates travelers’ accounts, then new observations serve to complete more of the narrative, which ultimately indicates how people progress towards God, the Christian telos. To achieve the prosperity writ into this cultural narrative, explorers and travelers must practice proper humanist/empiricist methods of observation when encountering unfamiliar lands, and to encourage this, the editors draw from the Royal Society, more specifically from a short piece by Lawrence Rooke, a founding member of the Royal Society, whose “Directions for Sea-men, bound for far Voyages” appeared in the Society’s Philosophical Transactions (1665-1666). The prefatory note states that the Royal Society’s purpose is “to study Nature rather than Books, and from the Observations, made of the Phaenomena and
Effects she presents, to compose a History of Her” (140-1). In order to write a proper “History” or story of nature, xxviii, Rooke and the Royal Society direct sea travelers to mark particulars, either noting longitude and latitude or plotting coasts, promontories, islands, etc. The editors add: “travelers ought to carry about him several sorts of measures, to take the dimensions of such things as require it” (lxxi; col. 2). By highlighting these “measures” and quantifying experience, the editors affirm their connection to Rubiés’ “Humanity sensibility” because these particulars contribute to collective knowledge and assist others in formulating a complete history or story of nature. This narrative will help people understand where they reside within the progression of the Western narrative so that they may ascend towards happiness and prosperity in a European-defined global community.

John Harris’s Prefatory Material

In the 1705 edition of Navigantium, John Harris’s “Epistle Dedicatory” to the queen and Introduction reflect this pre-determined hierarchical and cultural narrative. When addressing Queen Anne, Harris underscores England’s own cultural supremacy, stating: “when […] a Man hath actually travell’d the whole World himself, […] he will be abundantly convinced, that Our own Religion, Government and Constitution is, in the Main, much preferable to any he shall meet with Abroad.”xxxix Granted, he writes for the preferment and flattery of a patron, but by insisting upon his own culture’s supremacy, he reveals a propensity to measure the world in terms of a definite narrative. Even after surveying the diversity of the world, one must come to the conclusion that one’s own country and religion is superior to others. This conception indicates the authorizing narrative of the hierarchical and providential order in nature that directs people towards Christian prosperity because “Providence seems graciously to have design’d to make us Great and Happy.” By pointing to the importance of providence and prosperity, Harris
superimposes, like the Churchills, a teleological narrative upon travel, which authorizes travel experiences.

Harris’s Introduction reinforces this overarching narrative by beginning with a biblical “Origination of Mankind.” Harris states that “the World had a Beginning, and that Mankind had it first Original about the Time we have so particular an Account of in the Sacred History of the Bible” (i; pt. I, col. 1). Following the Churchills, Harris’s collection offers an account of the unfolding and overarching biblical narrative, and his Introduction traces a biblical trajectory. The narrative itself validates what Europeans perceive as they experience the world, as shown with Moses’ “account,” which demonstrates the biblical narrative’s authority: “the Account which Moses gives us of the peopling of the Earth after the Deluge by Noah’s Children, is so conformable to all the authentick Records yet remaining in any languages, that it carries with it irresistible Evidence” (i; pt. I, col. 1). In an unexplored and un-traveled world, experiences and observations already fit into the predetermined pattern outlined by the biblical narrative. The narrative serves as an authorizing template for documenting and cataloguing phenomena. Its authority is “irresistible,” and subsequent travels add to this narrative: “Every step taken by a first Discoverer, presents an Original in those Matters; otherse that come after, do but Copy and Refine upon him, and continue the Story that he begins” (4; bk. 1, ch. 1, col. 2). Travel and exploration fits into a narrative or “Story” that the travelers and explorers relate through their experiences in foreign lands. The beginning of the story has been written, and now by collecting particulars, explorers accumulate knowledge, detailing the unfolding storyline.

Yet the detailed documentation of experiences and observations, encouraged by Harris, the Churchills, and the Royal Society, complicates their notion of a hierarchical and historical narrative, as seen in Thomas Osborne’s 1745 addition to the Churchills’ Voyages and Travels
and John Campbell’s updated 1744 edition of Harris’s *Navigantium*, showing how the external authority of the older discourse’s implicit teleology cedes more and more to the internal authority of the newer discourse and its focus on the local, self-interest, and commerce.

**Mid-Eighteenth-Century Collections and Natural Law Rhetoric**

Thomas Osborne’s *A Collection of Voyages and Travels* (1745) functions as a medial point within the shift in travel discourse, incorporating aspects of the earlier preset universalism and the mid-eighteenth-century’s self-interested commercialism. Like the Churchills, he seeks to outline a “probable historical account of the first invention of navigation,” and thus says: “it is indisputably true from the authority of the sacred records, the structure of the ark owed and intitled its original contexture to the industrious precaution of *Noah*, who, by the immediate designation of God himself, brought that wooden island into shape and order” (xx; col. 1). The origins of navigation start with Noah, and the sacred records’ indisputable authority confirms this. Nevertheless, instead of beginning his Introduction with the biblical narrative, Osborne opts for an exposition of geography so that readers may understand the “situation, motion, substance and constitution, dimensions and bigness, and measurement of the earth” (i; col. 2). By starting with “dimensions, bigness, and measurement,” he prioritizes quantifying phenomena, which document the empirical reality of travel and exploration, thus favoring Elsner and Rubiés’ “humanist” rather than “universalist” sensibility. Osborne continues this expository style until he discusses the “original of people” on page 11, mentioning Noah’s flood, thereby showing the empiricist sensibility presiding over the authorizing teleological narrative.

Departing further from previous collections, Osborne connects more plainly the biblical narrative to navigation and commerce. He states: “it is probable, that the posterity of *Noah,*
having plantations [...] might [...] form and build such ships, and other vessels [...] as might make rivers and more spacious waters obvious to a passage, and maintain such a necessary intercourse, as might improve a commerce between nation and nation” (xx; col.1). Navigation originates with Noah and the ark, and thereafter they build more ships, which ultimately increases commerce between nations. Osborne adds, “So truly it has been said, navigation was the parent of trade; and trade has always been the support and encouragement of navigation” (xlv-xlv). Although the story of navigation begins with the biblical narrative, and navigation antecedes trade, thus indicating that the biblical narrative produces the capacity for trade, Osborne chooses to connect trade and commerce with another source, disclosing the influence of seventeenth-century natural law language:

From the natural propensity of human nature towards self-preservation, it is natural to suppose, that having provided for the mutual security of every man’s property, in their respective societies or governments, their next care was how to furnish themselves with the necessaries and conveniences of life, by propagating a commerce between all and each of those governments, nations or countries, wherein they were dispersed; and this for the mutual good and benefit of the whole, as well as for the private gain and interest of some individuals of each place. (xlv; col. 1-2)

The reference to “natural propensity of human nature towards self-preservation” imitates the natural law language of seventeenth-century natural law thinkers like Thomas Hobbes. In Leviathan (1651) Hobbes argues that the ultimate good is self-preservation to which the laws of nature direct people. Additionally the phrases, “mutual security of every man’s property” and “conveniences of life” reproduce the language of John Locke’s “Of Property” in Second Treatise of Government (1689). Natural law notions, like “self-preservation” and “every man’s property”, offer a conceptual scaffolding for Osborne that supplements the teleological account of navigation, trade, and commerce. He at once draws from the language of a preset, authorizing
Christian narrative while simultaneously alluding to natural law language that favors the independent authority of people existing within a particular and distinct “place”. By drawing upon the biblical narrative and natural law language and connecting these to commerce, Osborne represents a pivotal point within the change of discourse as empiricism, local authority, and reciprocity supersede the older discourse of history, teleology, and hierarchy.xxxii

In Campbell’s updated version of Navigantium, Astley’s / Green’s 1745 edition, and Button’s 1754/55 New Universal Collection, the editors avoid directly referencing a biblical narrative and instead imitate the language of seventeenth-century natural law, demonstrating that natural law rhetoric moves from an ancillary to a primary position in accounting for travel, navigation, commerce, and the conception of the Other.

Seventeenth-Century Natural Law Rhetoric and the New Framework

Baruch Spinoza, Locke, and Richard Cumberland offer paradigmatic and influential accounts that diminish the role of teleology, hierarchy, and history and foreground people’s critical reasoning capacity, how they function in nature, their self-interest, and their reciprocal connection to a larger indefinite community.xxxiii First, natural law rhetoric of the seventeenth century removes the notion of a teleological narrative from accounts of nature. In Ethics (1677) Spinoza argues that God is nature, thus making it difficult for people to insist that humans move towards or rise to God within a Christian narrative:xxxiv “Nature has no fixed goal and … all final causes are but figments of the human imagination” (240; pt. I, “App”). Spinoza adds, “Nature does not act with an end in view”, and “the eternal and infinite being, whom we call God, or Nature, acts by the same necessity whereby it exists” (321; pt. IV, “Pref”). For Spinoza, people attain the good and come to understand God by using reason and seeking knowledge of nature
and natural phenomena: “Therefore it is of the first importance in life to perfect the intellect, or
reason, as far as we can, and the highest happiness or blessedness for mankind consists in this
alone” (358; pt. IV, “App”). By stressing reason / intellect and laws of nature, Spinoza
diminishing the authority of external sources. Reason and nature together produce adequate ideas
by understanding necessity and universality of natural phenomena, xxxv whereas external sources
such as the senses, opinions, imagination, superstitions, traditions, and / or narratives provide
imperfect, disjointed, and “mutilated” knowledge (267; pt. II, prop. 40, sch. 2). Spinoza adds,
“nobody, unless he is overcome by external causes contrary to his own nature, neglects to seek
his own advantage” (332; pt. IV, prop. 20, sch.).

By stressing reason, Locke’s natural law rhetoric follows a similar course as Spinoza, in
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) and Two Treatises of Government (1689), but
additionally he diminishes hierarchy by highlighting people’s inclinations, which promotes
moral and political equality amongst peoples and nations. xxxvi Locke offers a conception of
nature that relies upon the equality and authority of particular citizens, xxxvii stating: “Nature, I
confess, has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery … these may be
observed in all persons and all ages, steady and universal; but these are inclinations of the
appetite to good, not impressions of truth on the understanding” (31; bk. I, ch. III, sec. 3). xxxviii
Nature has given people desires or inclinations towards happiness, but these inclinations are not
impressed truths directing people to a definite end. Rather people determine happiness by
applying their natural faculties, sense and reason, to acquire knowledge of their surroundings
from laws of nature. Locke states: “There is a great deal of difference between an innate law and
a law of nature, between something imprinted in our minds in their very original, and something
that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our
natural faculties” (36; bk. I, ch. III, sec. 13). People may use their faculties, reason and sense, to determine the laws of nature, established by God at creation, to determine right or wrong action and prosper within their local surroundings. Knowledge does not point to an innate, preset teleological order within nature; rather, people use their reason and senses to determine how they should act. 

Spinoza removes teleology from nature and dismisses external authority; Locke supersedes hierarchy by underscoring people’s inclinations and natural faculties; and finally in De Legibus (1672) Cumberland unites people reciprocally within a larger indefinite community, arguing that humans possess a natural inclination to benevolence and use experience and reason to guide this inclination towards the common good in the universal moral community of God, the “City, or Kingdom, of God”. For Cumberland, people understand natural law through science, as long as they practice empirical discipline, perceiving necessary relationships in nature, authored by God. His theory condenses into “one universal formula”: people should “Endeavour, according to [their] Ability, to promote the common Good of the whole System of Rationals [that is, rational agents]” (262; “Intro,” sec. XV). This “whole system” is, for Cumberland, the city or kingdom of God, which is a “System of all rational agents, or the whole natural City of God” with “God, the Head and Father of all rational Beings”. People are citizens of this city not because of a political or cultural designation, but because they reason: “common Reason, which directeth to common Good, to be the common Law, […] uniteth the Universe of rational agents into one Kingdom” (34; ess. 1, sec. III). All people are rational agents, who unite reciprocally within the same kingdom or city of God, irrespective of beliefs, customs, or practices. This larger, indeterminate community of “Rationals” represents people’s reciprocal relations to each other, which is “first known by Sense and Experience” (254; “Intro,” sec. VI).
Cumberland contributes to the natural law framework by reinforcing recurring terms like reason, sense, and experience, while adding that these notions unite people within a larger, reciprocal, and indeterminate community. This larger community does not derive its validity from a preset narrative and *telos*, but rather, it unites discrete peoples and nations within a larger limitless system through their particular inclinations and critical reasoning capacity. As we will see, these seventeenth-century natural law notions offer the conceptual scaffolding for the editors of mid-eighteenth-century travel collections to frame their discourse when accounting for travel and navigation as well as distant peoples and nations.

**Mid-Eighteenth-Century Collections, Self-Interest and Commerce**

*Campbell’s Navigantium*

Registering the shift from the discourse of an implicit hierarchy and teleology, Campbell’s 1744 Dedication of Harris’s *Navigantium* announces unambiguously in the title its altered tone: “To the Merchants of Great-Britain”. Campbell admits that he “endeavoured … to avoid the Faults for which most modern Dedications are censured, which are a mean Attention to Interest, or the Vanity of placing great Names and high Titles in the Front of Books” (unpaginated; “Ded,” par. 1). Instead of appealing to rank and status, he appeals to a new group with its alternate narrative of prosperity—merchants and commerce. Imitating the language used in natural law theory, he states, “Reason and Experience” will “shew, that we owe that Connection, which, at present, reigns between Countries far remote from each other, and that kind Intercourse subsisting between different and distant Nations, to a Spirit of Commerce” (unpaginated; “Ded,” par. 2). Such a statement is significant, especially when compared to earlier travel collections, because for the Churchills and Harris, reason and experience indicate
how travel experiences fit within the Christian narrative writ into nature, revealing how they advance to a Christian telos. In the newer framework, reason and experience indicate that a “Spirit of Commerce” provides the “Connection” between countries and nations. A “Spirit,” rather than a teleological Christian narrative, accounts for travel and relations between particular nations and peoples, and he frames this “Spirit” within natural law language:

If we reflect on the Reason of the Thing, it will appear, that Commerce is founded on Industry, and cherished by Freedom. These are such solid Pillars, that whatever Superstructure is erected upon them, cannot easily be overthrown by Force, but must be ruined by Sap: This too we find justified by History and Experience. (vii; “Intro”)

The empiricism of Elsner and Rubíés’ humanist sensibility antecedes a preset narrative because reason and experience show the triumph of commerce when reviewing the scope of history. Since commerce “is founded on Industry” of a people (again imitating Locke’s language in “Of Property” xlv rather than a biblical narrative, then actions and choices of particular people increase in influence because they refract forms of “Industry” within specific cultural contexts. Campbell notes, “Experience has made almost all Nations sensible of the Importance of Trade. […] Thus] whoever would have a competent Knowledge of the Weight and Influence of any People, must be well acquainted with their Character and Circumstances in this respect” (vii, “Intro”). In this new commercial narrative of prosperity, which stresses the industry of particular people, Campbell maintains that readers must understand the “Character and Circumstances” of distant nations and peoples, in order to determine how they make choices to contribute to trade, commerce, and prosperity.

Not only does he remove a Christian telos and hierarchy from nature, replacing it with a “Spirit,” xlv but by focusing on “Industry” and “Character and Circumstances,” Campbell foregrounds people’s inclinations and natural faculties, thus reinforcing the internal and local
authority of particular peoples and nations. “Industry” and “Freedom” help people cultivate their immediate surroundings, for Campbell, and, similar to Osborne, after acquiring “Necessities”, they have “Time to exercise the Faculties of their Minds, and to look abroad for greater Conveniences” (unpaginated; “Ded,” par. 3). After producing more, people more readily apply the “Faculties of their Minds”, which, in turn, “produced Trade”, “Invention of Shipping”, and improvement in the “Art of Navigation”. Not only do these expressions imitate Locke’s language in “On Property”, but also “Faculties of their Minds” echoes Locke’s “natural faculties” of reason and sense in *Essay*. The invention of shipping and improvement of the art of navigation are things, in the words of Locke, “that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural faculties” (36; bk. I, ch. III, sec. 13). Campbell indicates similarly that by tending to themselves, their proximate surroundings, people acquire necessities and then use the “Faculties of their Minds” to produce, invent, and improve. Since they produce and invent based upon their industry and faculties, we see why Campbell wants people to examine the “Character and Circumstances” of particular peoples. A particular nation’s “Industry”, “Freedom”, and “Faculties of their Minds” produce distinctive cultural choices specific to the circumstances of their lives. If travelers and travel readers fail to examine these circumstances, they neglect information that would contribute to their commercial well-being: “upon a strict Review it will be found, that even amongst the most uncouth and barbarous Nations, there are many ingenious Inventions to be met with” (unpaginated; vol. 2, “Pref,” par. 3). Since people and nations possess different needs and desires, or inclinations, based upon their circumstances, then they produce different “Inventions”, satisfying their particular needs. Campbell’s account differs significantly from the Churchills’ prefatory material and Harris’s earlier collection because he connects travel to discrete inclinations, interests, and faculties of
mind, which carry their own distinct authority. Instead of connecting navigation and trade to an authorizing cultural narrative, he connects it to the inclinations and critical reasoning capacity of particular groups, providing for themselves in their immediate environment. Tellingly in the Preface to volume 1, Campbell asks, “Can any Man doubt, that the seeing different Countries, considering the several Humours, Customs and Conditions of various Nations, and comparing them with each other, and our own, is the readiest Way to Wisdom?” (unpaginated; par. 4).

This focus on internal and local authority produces a larger commercial community of diverse nations and cultures. After attaining “Necessities”, people look “abroad for greater Conveniencies”, and “This produced Trade”, for Campbell, “which is particular to our Species, and the primary Characteristick of rational Beings” (unpaginated; “Ded,” par. 3). As “rational Beings” or “Rationals”, look outside themselves, they produce unity by seeking a common good. Campbell clarifies this good: “The Desire of reciprocally communicating the Fruits of various Soils and different Climates, is that Principle of Unity, which agreeable to the Will of GOD, makes all the Inhabitants of the several Regions of the Globe, appear … they were but one People” (unpaginated; “Ded,” par. 2). Unity between peoples and nations occurs, for Campbell, by “reciprocally communicating the Fruits of various Soils and different Climates”. As long as diverse people possess “Freedom” to exercise their “Industry” to acquire “Necessities”, they may use the “Faculties of their Minds” for invention and improvement and thereby look outside their local community to “reciprocally” communicate and interact with others, a “primary Characteristick of rational Beings”. People unite together in a larger community or they interact globally by focusing on and cultivating their immediate environment, satisfying and fulfilling their local interest. Commerce, for Campbell, “encourages People, not barely to labour for the Supply of their own Wants, but to have an Eye to those of other Nations, even such as are at the
greatest Distance” (unpaginated; “Ded,” par. 6). In this sense, people’s faculties authorize their actions by determining their local interests, and these local interests unite all within a commercially reciprocating, larger, indeterminate community.

“[P]rivate Interests” and the “noble and generous” “Arts of Commerce”, “extend to all Mankind” (xvi; “Intro”), and thus show in the Preface to the second volume, how reciprocity inheres in colonialism:

The great Point with respect to Plantations, is to shew, that the Riches, Power, and Happiness of the Mother-Country, depends, in a great Measure, upon them; and that, on the other Hand, this Connection is so far from being grievous, burthensome, or prejudicial to the Colonies, that, on the contrary, their Peace, Welfare, and Prosperity, are dependent upon this, and upon this only; so that the Benefits and Advantages of Settlements and their Mother-Countries are always reciprocal; whence arises the Tie of mutual Obligation. (unpaginated; par. 2)

Instead of the culturally determinate “Christendome” of Hakluyt or the “empire of Europe” of the Churchills, Campbell insists upon a unified indeterminate community where the mother country and the colonized people reciprocally support and maintain each other, as each pursues its own diverse and particular interests. Ultimately, this notion of reciprocal colonization lapses into a culturally biased conception of world empire that largely has mutual exchange serving the self-interests of a dominant culture and nation. Nevertheless, Campbell’s natural law rhetoric refashions this notion of a larger indeterminate community—realized by cultivating local industry, freedom, and faculties of mind—by allowing nations to interact within a reciprocating commercial enterprise. This shift to local authority and self-interest directly challenges and subverts the older discourse’s reliance upon external authority, teleology, and hierarchy. Campbell adds, “The large History ensuing may be considered as a practical Commentary […] that where these Notions are adverted to and followed, Mother-Countries and
their Plantations thrive equally, and that both pine, dwindle and decay, where these Maxims are either neglected or despised” (unpaginated; “Preface,” vol. 2, par. 2). The individual travel narratives document the story of commercial prosperity and how it places all nations within a reciprocating, unified, larger community. Instead of focusing on how people’s experiences fit externally within a teleological progression towards a religious good, people’s experiences will be measured locally and internally, based upon the amount dictated by local interests and their proximate surroundings.

**Astley / Green Collection**

Astley / Green follow Campbell by openly distinguishing their collection from the Churchills, foregrounding local interest and commerce. Green chooses not to “follow the Example of the generality of Authors, who are for carrying their Disquisitions, not only as far back as the Flood, but even beyond it” (1; vol. 1, “Intro,” col. 1). He maintains the futility of applying the biblical narrative to navigation, noting that “all that can be said, must be pure Conjecture” (1; vol. 1, “Intro,” col. 1). Instead of relying upon circumspect evidence, or “Conjecture,” Green’s Introduction seeks to document the “Rise and Progress of Navigation and Commerce,” focusing on travel as it relates to times when trade and commerce prospered or waned. For example, we find that “the maritime Powers of Asia had their Fleets in the flourishing Times of their Empires, and traded to India … is more than probable” and events, like the “Croisades” made a “great Interruption to Commerce” (4; vol. 1, “Intro,” col. 1). Similar to Campbell, Green does not appeal to the biblical narrative to authorize travel accounts; rather, he substitutes the narrative of trade and commerce, which privileges the habits and interests of particular peoples.
By describing particular rituals and ceremonies, as Green notes in his Preface to volume II, travel readers acquire a more complete understanding:

nothing confirms the Truth of a Remark, […] as an Instance shewing the Virtues or Vices of People; and thus an Account from an Author of a Coronation, Funeral, Execution, or the like, which he delivers as an Eye-Witness, gives the Reader a far more lively and satisfactory Idea of the same […]: Because for one you have the Author’s own Authority, or the Particulars, such as they really were. (vi; vol. 2, “Preface”)

Green follows Campbell’s stress upon the “Character and Circumstance” of people by “shewing the Virtues or Vices”. By reading the traveler’s original account of those customs readers benefit from receiving the “Author’s own Authority” and seeing “the Particulars, such as they really were.” The authority of the traveler’s perspective overrides any other authority because she more directly observes the customs and habits of a people or a nation. Such an observation leads the Green to comment in the Preface to the third volume about Peter Kolben’s *The Present State of the Cape of Good-Hope* (1731), regarding the Khoikhoi or the westernized “Hottentots” of southern Africa:

> We presume, the Reader will be both surprised and pleased with the agreeable Variety he finds in the Manners and Customs of these People; whom the Ignorance or Malice of most former Authors had represented as Creatures but one degree removed from Beasts, and with scarce any Thing human about them except the Shape: Whereas, in Fact, they appear to be some of the most humane and virtuous (abating for a few Prejudices of Education) to be found among all the Race of Mankind. (v-vi; vol. 3, “Pref”)

The more readers learn about the practices and habits of the Khoikhoi, the better their understanding, and the more they recognize that they “appear to be come of the most humane and virtuous.” By underscorign the authority of the travelers’ account of particular customs and habits, the editor indicates how focusing on cultural difference increases understanding. Indeed when referring to the “surprizing Wealth” and “Plenty” of China, Green remarks, contrasting...
with the tone of Harris’s Dedication, that “China may be called the terrestrial Paradise of the present World” (vi; vol. 3, “Pref”).

A New Universal Collection

Edward Button follows Campbell and Green, even borrowing the previous editors’ language concerning cultural difference and commerce. Button states explicitly that he follows Harris’s plan: “we have in this point, very nearly pursued the same plan as is laid down by the ingenious Dr. Harris” (xii-xiii; “Intro.”). He refers, however, to Campbell’s 1745 edition because he directly borrows Campbell’s language regarding travel and commerce, referring to “spirit” and “industry”: “the spirit of industry in extending commerce, has ranged from kingdom to kingdom, now fixing its residence in one nation, then in another” (iii; “Intro.”); and “For a nation, like a private family, changes its condition and recovers from the pressures it formerly laboured under, by prudent oeconomy, and industry rightly applied: by industry with regard to a state, we would be understood to mean a strict application to trade and commerce” (xiii; “Intro”). For Button industry shows how people and nations contribute to commercial prosperity, and a people’s “industry” points to the importance of their distinctive customs and habits: “whoever would have a true notion of the influence of any people or government must be well acquainted with their character, and circumstances in regard to commerce” (ix; “Intro”). In this telling excerpt, Button reveals how the newer discourse has overtaken the rhetoric of travel and exploration. He repeats Campbell’s phrase, “Character and Circumstances,” thereby revealing his own absorption and application of the newer travel discourse, privileging the authority of particular cultures and their distinct cultural practices. Like Campbell, he thinks commerce and trade offer another narrative for prosperity where “we may expect to see such great events, and another golden age restored” (xii; “Intro”).
exercising their industry and following their self-interest, nations may create a commercial
golden age, in which participants reciprocally satisfy the other’s needs. He adds in his
“Conclusion” to volume 3 that “the powerful and the opulent may find useful hints given for
making further discoveries, which would undoubtedly tend to the great benefit of the mercantile
part of Great Britain, and redound to the honour of the true patriot” (464-65). “Christendome”
and “empire of Europe” cede to the particular interests of Great Britain and the authority of the
discrete state, pursuing commercial gain within a world community punctuated by competing
interests.

This change in travel language and the notion of the Other reflects a change from seeing
“nature” in terms of teleology and hierarchy to seeing it as inclinations, critical reasoning
capacity, and self-interest. The new “nature” and framework resist locating the Other within a
larger global community defined by a definite telos, because each nation’s self-interest, as
dictated by its native reason and inclinations, determines how and why they choose, invent, and
improve. People acquire a local and internal authority based upon their distinct experiences and
observations. This newer discourse allows different communities, nations, and peoples to
prosper while resisting categorizing their discrete customs within a historical, hierarchical, and
teleological narrative that posits a determinate and universal European empire. Thus,
Campbell’s, Green’s, and Button’s change in rhetoric reflects a change towards the local,
particular, and indeterminate; people’s faculties, rather than an external narrative, serve as the
authority to their experiences.
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Notes

i Francis Wilson uses Voyages and Travels to argue how Defoe lampoons the popular image of the Chinese.

ii See Mukhtar A. Isani or Horace E. Hamilton, who looks at Harris’s influence on James Thomson.

iii Marshall and Williams discuss how these collections added to the renewed popularity of travel narratives, 48-49. See also Warner, 25, and Crone and Skelton.

iv See James Helfer’s discussion of Hakluyt’s and Purchas’s use of religious appeals, 173-174.

v Crone and Skelton note that in 1747 Osborne owned the copyright of Churchills’ collection.

vi Warner, English Maritime Writing, 34.

vii Unlike Churchill’s and Harris’s editions, other early eighteenth-century large collections lack extensive introductory sections, such as James Knapton’s A New Collection of Voyages and Travels, which appeared six years later in 1711, as well as the Royal Society’s third volume of Miscellanea Curiosa: Containing a collection of Curious Travels and Natural Histories of Countries (1st edition 1707, 2nd edition 1727). Even though John Green is not mentioned by name on the title page, C.R. Crone offers evidence indicating that John Green wrote the Preface. Also see Edward Button’s reference to Green and his collection in New Universal Collection (1755), iv. Even though Osborne’s edition appears chronologically after Campbell’s, Osborne’s text will be analyzed first to show more effectively the shift between the older and newer discourses. The shift in language did not occur linearly or suddenly, but coalesced gradually and disjointedly around a new cultural rhetoric of travel and the Other.
Although the compiler is not acknowledged in the text, the British Library registers Edward Button as the ostensible editor for the 1754 edition, and also as the compiler for the 1755 edition. The 1754 edition contains this written note across from the frontispiece: “The Compiler, Edward Button, formerly of Kilncote, Leicestershire. The completion of the work was prevented by his death.”

Each editor was aware of the previous collections, referring to collections by the editors’ names and usually noting how their compilation differed from those before.

Here I use “discourse” in the way that Edward Said uses it from Foucault in *Orientalism* (1978). As Foucault maintains in *Archaeology of Knowledge*: “There is a notion of ‘spirit’, which enables us to establish between the simultaneous or successive phenomena of a given period a community of meanings, symbolic links, an interplay of resemblance and reflexion, or which allows the sovereignty of collective consciousness to emerge as the principle of unity and explanation”, 22.

See Elsner and Rubiés, 47-48.

I use “framework” and “discourse” similarly to refer at once to Foucault’s notion of discourse as well as Heidegger’s conception of “frame” or “Ge-stett,” an ideological mesh or frame that controls / directs being. Heidegger discusses this en-framing. See also, Charles B. Guignon: “The Anglo-American tradition generally tends to see philosophy as a set of current topics or problems that are to be discussed within pre-given frameworks. … Heidegger maintains that it is these frameworks themselves that are the source of traditional philosophical problems”, 1.

These are not new claims or observations; several important texts outline this earlier framework. It originates from the Middle Ages, propelled by Augustine’s thought, and creates a unifying, progressive, and hierarchical metaphysics for European nations, i.e., Christendom.
Gierke states that “all Order consists in the subordination of Plurality to Unity … and never and nowhere can a purpose that is common to Many be effectual unless the One rules over the Many and directs the Many to the goal. So is it among the heavenly spheres; so in the harmony of the heavenly bodies, which find their Unity in the primum mobile. So is it in every living organism. Here the Soul is the aboriginal principle, while Reason among the powers of the Soul and the Heart among the bodily organs are the representatives of Unity”, 9. See Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self and A Secular Age. Both describe Augustine’s important role in defining the internal / external notion (internal and external authority) of the Western consciousness. In this pre-modern framework, hierarchy serves an important role, according to W.H. Greenleaf, because “[o]rder implied the harmonious maintenance of each form of being in the place designed for it in the divine plan of creation and its obedient subordination to the degrees of being superior to it”, 26. To see other descriptions of this “old” hierarchical order, see Figgis and Lovejoy. The notion of connecting progress to Christian history and narrative follows from Augustine; see Teggart, The Idea of Progress. See also Dyson’s Introduction in Augustine, The City of God, xxi, and Anthony Pagden, Lords of all the World, Chapter 1, especially his discussion of Christendom and its connection to Aristotelian eudaimonia.

xiv In Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor explains this framework of reason, knowledge, and higher understanding in terms of Augustine’s philosophy: “Augustine’s proof of God is a proof from the first-person experience of knowing and reasoning. I am aware of my own sensing and thinking; and in reflecting on this, I am made aware of its dependence on something beyond it, something common. But this turns out on further examination to include not just objects to be known but also the very standards which reason gives allegiance to. So I recognize that this
activity which is mine is grounded on and presupposes something higher than I, something which I should look up to and revere. By going inward, I am drawn upward”, 134.

\textsuperscript{xv} \textit{New Worlds, Ancient Texts}, 255.

\textsuperscript{xvi} A specific example of a “rude fact” can be found in Captain George Shelvocke’s voyage to the west coast of North America. Shelvocke describes his personal experiences of Baja natives and how these contrast with prescribed notions of Western dress, decorum, civility, and order. Shelvocke observes “there is a wide difference between what one would, upon the first sight, expect to find from them, and what they really are”, 404-406.

\textsuperscript{xvii} Michel de Certeau’s distinction between “strategy” and “tactic” demonstrates how cultural standards and norms are subject to practical experiences. Everyday practices and “tactics” are “multiform and fragmentary”, xv, and ultimately change “the status of the discourse” by acknowledging that the dominant discourse and its “analyzed ‘object’” are both “organized by the practical activity” and “determined by rules they neither establish nor see clearly, equally scattered in differentiated ways of working”, 11. As a result, the dominant “strategy” or discourse “disappears into the ordinary,” and “[t]his disappearance has as its corollary the invalidation of truths”, 11. In this essay, I argue that the “invalidation of truths” or the older travel discourse cedes to a newer framework of truth, influenced by seventeenth-century natural law theory.

\textsuperscript{xviii} In this essay, I am not concerned with showing how travel accounts complicate traditional views. Others have done this before me, such as Grafton, Greenblatt, or Frantz, who, for example, describes how observations described in the “new science” exert “considerable pressure on crystallized institutions”. Frantz stresses that “[t]he various forces that produced seventeenth- and eighteenth-century humanitarianism, toleration, and cosmopolitanism were …
many; but not least among them must have been the influence exerted by travel-books”, 118.

Instead, in this essay I will show how Western discourse changes as a response to travel’s “considerable pressure on crystallized institutions.”

“Critical reasoning capacity” refers to depiction of the change of the role of reason for Paul Hazard.

Tuck notes that one characteristic of this new nature and its framework is that “an individual in nature … was morally identical to a state, and that there were no powers possessed by a state which an individual could not possess in nature”, 82.

Much of the natural law accounts and terminology in this study follows Martin Rhonheimer’s analysis.

This position contrasts with critical studies that focus on the hegemonic tendencies of Western discourse. Casey Blanton states, “In effect, the eighteenth-century traveler begins to admit to and exploit the connection between the world and self, yet the ‘hegemonic reflex’ posits the European, and therefore modern, world as superior both in time and space”, 12. For similar positions see Said; Hartog; Pratt; and Matar.


Anthony Pagden describes the medieval empires and those that may succeed them in terms of an “Aristotelian identity”. He adds, “The ancient polis had made human flourishing — *eudaimonia* — possible. By rendering *eudaimonia* as ‘blessedness’ …, Aristotle’s thirteenth-century translator, Robert Grosseteste, had made that a state which it was clearly only possible to achieve within the territorial limits of the Christian *monarchia*”, 27.

James Helfers discusses this religious tone and its coupling with a “naïve patriotic confidence about England’s exploratory efforts”, 173.
It is widely accepted that John Locke did not write the introductory section, although it is sometimes attributed to him. John Locke and Awnsham Churchill were friends. See Crone and Skelton, 81-84. See also, E.S. De Beer.

See Pagden, 24-27.

The OED indicates that the first definition for “history” means “a relation of incidents, ... a narrative, tale, story”. See OED, 2nd edition, 1989.

Unpaginated.

Paul E. Sigmund states, “Self-preservation through rational conduct is the single ‘natural law’ in Hobbes’ system, despite the fact that he never describes it this way”, 78-79.

In “Of Property,” Locke states, “God gave the World to Men in Common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest Conveniencies of Life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the Industrious and Rational, (and Labour was to be his Title to it;)” (309; ch. 5, sec. 34, lines 1-6).

The connection between natural law and commerce has been explored by Amalia D. Kessler in Chapter 4: “the law of commerce was synonymous with the laws of nature. In other words, since commerce was an expression of divinely created principles of human nature—principles of self-interest or necessity, on the one hand, and sociability or charity on the other—it was these very same principles that should govern its practice”, 159. I draw from Kessler’s argument to support my claim that natural law notions change the language of travel and by extension the conception of the Other in introductory sections of travel collections.

Spinoza, Locke, and Cumberland were born around the same time (1632), and they maintained tremendous influence on discussions of natural law, ultimately outlining the
characteristics of the “new” nature. Not only does Aaron Garrett maintain that Richard Cumberland was one of the “most important natural lawyers of the seventeenth century” or that John Locke “was also clearly deeply indebted to the natural law theory developed by Grotius”, 627, but Spinoza himself “wished to provide a kind of therapy to the natural law in showing that a consistent definition of natural law … results in truly fixed and determinate laws”, 636. I do not argue that the editors directly read and borrowed specific ideas from Spinoza, Locke, or Cumberland to inform their expositions on travel, although I think one may have a stronger case arguing this with Hobbes and Locke; nevertheless, their influence was so immense that the editors could not help being exposed to their thought, which radically altered European ideas. Jonathan Israel provides an outline of Spinoza’s influences.

See Garrett, “Spinoza’s Law and Ethics”. “For Spinoza, there is no natural hierarchy”, 636; and “There are no natural hierarchies to be discovered”, 640.

Aaron Garrett states, “Our minds are most stable and fixed when we understand reasons, since when we recognize the necessity in laws, they become necessary psychological laws from which we act consistently. The more this is the case, the less we need rely on any positive law, human or divine, and the more our minds are guided by the same fixed and determinate rules which govern all parts of nature”, 639.

Garrett explains Locke’s contrast to Spino: “There is no need for Locke to build up a complicated theory of the passions, insofar as pleasure and pain are primarily anchored in and refer to external laws rooted in the vast system of obligations, rights, and duties”, 640. Thus Lockean passions “refer us to an external system that gives them meaning” whereas with Spinoza, the “natural sanction is … built into the natural psychological laws of the passions”, 640.
“Consent based on natural equality had appeared in the writings of political theorists before Locke. […] However, for them consent was a corporate act of the community at some point in the past, while for Locke it was an individual act”, 84.

John Locke, Essay. Subsequent quotes come from this edition.

Daniel Carey states that Locke’s “accumulation of testimony on customs and manners treated human nature as something to be understood inductively, rather than through pre-assigned assumptions about essences”, 34. Yolton states that for Locke “[r]eason and sense are the sole foundations for all knowledge”, 482.

Jon Parkin provides a thorough account of seventeenth-century natural law theory and its influence upon Cumberland as well as Cumberland’s contributions to natural law theory. Parkin notes, “Cumberland’s conception of the common good does not stop at temporal forms of socialitas. … Cumberland seeks to universalise [sic] his socialitas, to form a general and universal proposition which applies to all rational agents, including God”, 104.

Schneewind argues that this observation is original and distinctive, 104. See also Ewald’s essay, 126.

Cumberland states, “it is owing to this most noble Motion of reciprocal Beneficence, that others reap like, and often, as occasion offers, greater Benefits, than those we obtain for ourselves” (617; ch. V, sec. XLVIII).

Charles Taylor, A Secular Age motivated these observations, 60.

Locke, “On Property” in Second Treatise: “Now of those good things which Nature hath provided in common, every one had a Right (as hath been said) to as much as he could use, and had a Property in all that he could affect with his Labour; all that his Industry could extend to, to alter from the State Nature had put it in, was his” (318; ch. V, sec. 46, lines 7-12).
Spinoza’s *conatus*, an inclination to preserve the self, may offer the means for Campbell to privilege an indefinite “Spirit” over a definite Christian *telos*. For Spinoza, by acting in accordance with nature, one “endeavors to preserve his own being,” and this comes “from the laws of his own nature”. Thus, “it follows … that the basis of virtue is the very conatus to preserve one’s own being, and that happiness consists in a man’s being able to preserve his own being” and “that those who commit suicide are of weak spirit and are completely overcome by external causes” (330-331; pt. IV, prop 18, sch.). Or there are references to “Spirit” in the third earl of Shaftesbury’s *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711), “A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm”, section VII. Again, I do not argue for a direct correlation between Campbell’s use of “Spirit of Commerce” and Spinoza and Shaftesbury, but rather highlight the rhetorical framework that permits such language.

Campbell returns to and reinforces this topic at varying points, for example, at the beginning of Book I from volume II: “Whereas other Conquests tend only to the Benefit of this or that Nation; these are advantageous to the Species, and add Dominion not to a single People, but to the whole Race of Mankind” (2; vol. II, bk. I, ch. III, sec. 1, col. 1).

Even though Campbell stresses the equality within the colonizing relation, he stresses how the commercial enterprise increases the power of the home country: “we owe many other great Advantages to this Commerce in the East. For, in the first place, it is the great Support of the Maritime Power of Europe; it makes us Masters of all other Parts of the Globe” (984; vol. 1, “Concl”). Jennifer Pitts provides a helpful distinction here. Initially a “tolerant and pluralist universalism” predominated eighteenth-century thought, “one premised on the equal rationality of all human beings and the belief that standards of morality and justice that governed relations within Europe also obligated Europeans in their dealings with other societies”. However, “in the
first half of the nineteenth century” a “progressivist universalism” developed that “justified
European imperial rule as a benefit to backward subjects”, and “authorized the abrogation of
sovereignty of many indigenous states and licensed increasingly interventionist policies in
colonized societies’ systems of education, law, property, and religion”, 21.

xlviii However, like Campbell, by stressing self-interest, Green also exhibits a clear bias to
England in colonialism. In volume 2, Book II, the voyages to the western coast of Africa, he
argues for Parliament’s funding fort construction: “But how shall the Company be able to do this
Service to the Public, unless farther assisted by the Public? And there seems to be the more
Necessity for this, as both the French and Dutch, from a due Sense of the great national Benefits
arising from this Trade, support it by a national Encouragement” (161; vol. 2, bk. 2, ch. 1, sec. 1,
col. 2). Indeed without stating “self-interest” overtly, Green provides a thinly veiled support of
stronger British engagement in colonialism in western Africa, from a “due Sense of the great
national Benefits arising from this Trade”.

xlix Following Campbell’s and Green’s examples of following self-interest, Button states
“extensive commerce is the one thing necessary in politics”; “It is ridiculous for such a nation to
complain, … that her condition grows worse and worse; because it is in her own power to
remedy all these grievances, by consulting her own interest” (xii; “Intro.”).